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INTRODUCTION  
The Toyota Commemorative Museum of Industry and Technology gives its visitors much to 
ponder. Established at the site in Nagoya where in 1911 Sakichi Toyoda founded his automatic 
loom factory (the basis of the family fortune, which later funded his son Kiichiro’s development 
of automobile production), the museum was opened on June 11, 1994, the 100
th anniversary of 
Toyoda’s birth. It is a popular stop on field trips for Japanese schoolchildren, who are required to 
study in the 3
rd grade the automobile industry. The messages, which Toyota wishes to instill in its 
young visitors, are the importance of “making things” and of “creativity and research.” And 
confronting all museum visitors upon entry, having central place in the vast and largely empty 
first room of the exhibits, is Sakichi Toyoda’s one-of-a-kind vertical circular loom. 
As described in the museum’s catalog, “Even in the closing years of his life, [Sakichi 
Toyoda] continued to work to perfect the [vertical] circular loom. To symbolize this unfailing 
spirit of his, we are proud to exhibit the only circular loom he developed that is still in existence.” 
This first “Symbolic Exhibit in the Museum,” whose distinctive outline serves as the museum’s 
logo, was manufactured in 1924. Though Toyoda first applied for a patent in 1906 on a circular 
loom design, and eventually held a patent in 18 countries for the concept, and though the circular 
loom is quieter than flat looms (meaning it is also more energy efficient) and able to produce 
longer bolts of cloth without seams, the circular loom was never produced in volume. In fact, no 
sales, let alone profits, were ever made from this innovation. In 1924, Toyoda also perfected the 
Type G Automatic Loom, a flat “nonstop shuttle changing loom”–embodying an incremental but 
significant improvement on previous loom technology–which became Toyota’s all-time bestseller 
in the sector. The Type G Loom, however, is not the museum’s symbolic first exhibit or logo; 
instead, it takes its place chronologically back in the succession of exhibits. 
Why does one of Japan’s, and the world’s, leading manufacturing corporations choose to 
feature an innovative product, which was never brought successfully to market nor became any 
sort of technological standard, as the emblem of its tradition of industry and technology? Neither 
corporate public relations efforts, nor Japanese culture, are generally known for their sense of 
deliberate irony. Nor is either known for rewarding quixotic individual quests of little practical 
value to the larger purpose. Whether intentional or not, perhaps the message is the one given at 
face value: that technological innovation is its own reward, and should be appraised on its own 
noncommercial merits. While the process of innovation is certainly related to a corporation’s 
profitability, there is no easy one-to-one relationship between the best innovation and the best   3
economic results, beyond the fact that innovative people over the long run have the fundamental 
potential for success. 
What is true about innovation and performance for Toyota may well be true for Japan and 
other national economies. The story of Japan’s miraculous economic development after World 
War II is engrained in the world’s memory. No other large country had ever come so far, so fast. 
No other country from Asia (or anywhere else outside of Europe’s direct lineage) had attained 
Western levels of technology and wealth, was treated as an equal or even feared as an economic 
competitor by the United States, or had taken leadership in many advanced industrial sectors. No 
other country in history had racked up so many consecutive years of positive income growth. By 
the end of the 1980s, with the relative decline of American economic performance, and the 
influence of Japanese investors felt worldwide, scholars and pundits alike were advancing a 
“Japanese model” of economic management. This model included supposedly distinctive aspects 
of Japanese policy and corporate practice, including industrial policy, an emphasis on incremental 
innovation of industrial processes, relationship banking between business firms and their “Main 
Banks,” and export orientation. There seemed to be a clear message that Japan, as part of this 
model, had assembled a ‘national innovation system’, which conferred significant advantages for 
growth. 
Ten years later, the economic world has been turned upside down. It is the United States 
whose system is now held up as a model for economies around the world, which has run several 
years of strongly positive growth in a row, and which is considered the home of cutting edge 
technologies in the most attention-getting sectors, like information technology and biotechnology. 
Japan is now caught in the midst of an economic malaise, which it cannot seem to understand, let 
alone shake. This nearly complete reversal of fortune in Japan would seem to be a critical case 
study for understanding the determinants of national economic performance. Especially given the 
fear on the part of some American commentators and officials lasting into the mid-1990s that 
Japan was building an insurmountable lead in “critical technologies,”--as exemplified by the 
pressures for the US Sematech program--it is important to distinguish perception from reality in 
both technological and economic performance. 
From the perspective of 2001, after 10 years of slow or negative growth in Japan, there is 
reason to wonder whether Japanese technical prowess evaporated for some reason, whether 
national innovation systems can be somehow appropriate for capitalizing on particular waves of 
technological development and not others, or whether perhaps technological innovation alone is 
insufficient to guarantee good economic performance. On this last possibility, it should be 
recognized that the bulk of the Japanese economy conducts its business largely independent of   4
high-tech or anything resembling technological innovation. In this, however, Japan is completely 
normal, not distinctive – all advanced economies, including the United States, have vast shares of 
their resources employed in retail, service, governmental, and even manufacturing activities 
where technical change does not significantly alter productivity. There are only so many papers 
an academic can produce, so many patients a nurse can tend, so many students a teacher can 
teach, and so many 747s skilled mechanics can assemble, even as the IT revolution proceeds. A 
technological change must be very great in effect, or unusually wide in applicability as well as 
diffusion, like air-conditioning or interchangeable parts, to change a country’s overall economic 
performance
1 
In that light, it is worth emphasizing just how serious the Japanese economic downturn of 
the last decade has been as compared to the growth seen in the previous three decades in Japan or 
to the performance of the other industrial democracies. In the postwar period, no developed 
country lost as much growth versus potential in a recession as Japan did from 1990 to the present 
(a cumulative output gap in excess of 15 percent of a year’s GDP
2), and no developed country’s 
banking crisis imposed as high a direct cost to its citizens (upwards of 15 percent of a year’s GDP 
in bad loans requiring public bailout, and still rising--compared to the entire US savings and loan 
clean-up, which cost less than 3 percent of a year’s GDP). Corporate bankruptcies have been at 
all-time highs, and unemployment has risen to levels never before seen in Japan, with no end to 
either trend in sight. Understanding this remarkable deterioration of Japanese national economic 
performance has to be a central concern of any assessment of various factors’ roles in economic 
growth--and, given the size of the change, thereby sets a very high bar for the degree to which 
technological innovation must have changed in this instance to have played a leading role. 
This essay is organized around the relationship between Japanese technological 
innovation and the sustained decline in Japan’s growth rate in the 1990s as compared to the 
previous two decades (the very high growth rates of the catch-up period in the 1950s and 1960s 
are assumed to have been unsustainable). Examination of the huge shift in Japanese economic 
performance raises three aspects of the relationship between innovation and growth for 
consideration. The first aspect is how macroeconomic performance can radically change without 
any accompanying change in the inputs to the innovative process. Japan’s national system of 
innovation is largely unaltered in the 1990s from the system, which existed during Japan’s glory 
                                                                 
1 This is in a sense the message of Oliner and Sichel (1996), that to that point, investment in computers and 
related equipment was simply too small a share of the US economy to explain much in the way of swings 
in American growth.  Oliner and Sichel (2000), by contrast, updates their results once there had been 
sufficient investment for the IT sector to matter.   5
days, with a few of the minor alterations probably improvements in innovative capacity
3. The 
second aspect is the possibility that maintenance of a sustained high level of technological 
innovation can continue even as the economy surrounding the national innovation suffers. In 
today’s Japan, the production of high-tech patents and high-end exports, that is the measurable 
output of innovation, continues largely undiminished despite the erosion of macroeconomic 
conditions. It is usually assumed that during harder economic times financing and long-term 
investment for innovation are harder to come by, yet in the case of Japan in the 1990s that 
constraint appears not to have arisen. 
The third aspect is how, in an industrial democracy with free flows of information, 
advances in productivity can remain in a limited number of sectors without diffusing across the 
economy. This is both a question of social organization and of the nature of the technology 
advance in question. It has long been known, for example, that Japan has a “dual economy” with 
a gap in technical achievement between the highly competitive export sector and the backward 
domestic manufacturing, retail, and service sectors–this gap was true during the years of the 
Japanese miracle, and remains true if not widening today. In the United States, by comparison, 
there is an open debate whether the current gap will persist. Gordon (2001) argues that most of 
the technical advancement in the United States in the 1990s was confined to the manufacture of 
information technology because of the limited nature of the IT revolution. On the other side, the 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) (2001) argues that IT actually diffused into use much more 
widely in the American economy in the late 1990s than previously believed, both because it is a 
“transformative” technology (applicable throughout the economy) and because the US form of 
economic organization is prepared to take advantage of such a technology. The CEA report 
explicitly contrasts American flexibility in technological adoption to the barriers to the 
reallocation of capital and labor in the Japanese economy. Even if valid, such a characterization 
of Japan emphasizes that the link between technological innovation and national economic 
performance is intermediated by factors which have little to do with innovativeness per se, and 
which may affect national productivity more broadly as much as they interfere with technical 
diffusion. 
These aspects of the Japanese experience with technology and growth--that innovation 
inputs and outputs remained unchanged even as national economic performance varied widely, 
and that factors outside the national innovation system as traditionally defined have to be invoked 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Posen (1998, Appendix 1) and Posen (2001) for discussions of various means and results of 
estimating the Japanese output gap. 
3 A similar observation can be made with reference to the United States, which underwent little change in 
structure of innovation system, but a significant change in performance, between the 1980s and 1990s.   6
to make technology play a leading explanatory role--could be troubling if one insisted on 
believing that technological innovation and national economic performance are intimately related. 
The experience of Japan would seem to indicate that such a belief should not be too tightly held. 
Accepting an imperfect, or at least very long-term, connection between the two is to be preferred 
to making a circular argument, as some do, that the reason Japanese economic performance is 
poor is because the entire national innovation system that once worked for Japan is 
‘inappropriate’ for today’s world and technology, and the reason that we know the innovation 
system is inappropriate is that performance is poor. There are many other factors that determine a 
national economy’s macroeconomic performance over several year stretches besides its 
technological capabilities, including economic management of the business cycle and the 
financial system, and there are many other factors determining the ability of a country to 
innovate, beyond its growth rate. The inability of Japan’s world-beating process innovation and 
productivity in its export manufacturing sectors to limit the downward swing of the rest of the 
Japanese economy is an important reminder of just how independent or exogenous technological 
development is from most of what economics is about-–as was the case for Sakichi Toyoda’s 
circular loom. 
 
THE FACTS OF JAPANESE GROWTH PERFORMANCE – ONGOING DECLINE  
IN GROWTH, SHARP FALL-OFF IN THE 1990s  
 
What Happened in Japan 
The decline of economic performance in Japan in the 1990s was a sharp and lasting contrast to 
what went before. From 1990-97, first there was a fall in asset prices, then in corporate fixed 
investment, then in housing starts, then inventories, and then finally consumption. The stock 
market peaked in December 1989 and land prices reached their heights a year later. The OECD 
has estimated that the net wealth lost in the asset price declines of 1989-97 was of the order of 
200 percent of a year’s GDP, with 50 percent of those losses borne directly by households (at 
least on paper). Officially, the recession began in February 1991 and lasted until October 1993 
(see table 1). As Motonoshi and Yoshikawa (1999) observe, corporate investment was the key 
variable, with the fall in investment in 1992-94 and in 1998, more than two standard deviations in 
magnitude from the 1971-90 average year-on-year movements. Small and medium enterprises 
were particularly hard hit as the 1990s wore on, arguably due to a credit crunch as liquidity and   7
credit standards tightened in the second half of the decade
4. Size aside, this is actually the usual 
sequence of movements in demand components for a business cycle downturn following a 
bubble. What is unusual among the demand components listed in table 1 is the persistent flatness 
and in fact decline in consumption growth once things turned sour. 
The contrast was striking with the outstanding growth performance of the Japanese 
economy in the postwar period up until 1990, although every succeeding decade showed a 
slowdown in average growth rate (see table 2). In both the 1970s and 1980s, real GDP averaged 4 
percent or more annually, as opposed to the paltry 1.5-2.5 percent a year growth seen in most of 
the other OECD economies including the United States. Despite claims by some about Japanese 
households’ reluctance to consume, private consumption growth was solidly positive, prior to 
1990, in fact more than comparable to the growth in residential investment, and even meeting or 
exceeding the rate of growth in disposable income from 1971-97. Meanwhile, the rate of growth 
of exports slowed every decade. The presumptive bubble can be seen in the 8.1 percent growth in 
business fixed investment from 1981-90, especially when one considers that Japan was in 
recession up through the end of 1984, meaning most of that investment was concentrated in just 
five years. 
Looking a bit more descriptively, it is possible to follow Yoshikawa (2000) and break up 
postwar Japanese economic development before 1990 into two periods. From 1955-1972, the 
Japanese economy grew by an average 10 percent a year. Like continental Europe during its 
period of postwar rebuilding, the Japanese workforce started with extensive technological skills 
and other human capital close to the US level [Goto and Odagiri (1997)]. Like continental 
Europe, there was a rapid shift of households from rural to urban areas, and of production from 
agricultural to industrial products, both trends increasing the number of households. And, like in 
postwar continental Europe, rising real incomes fed and were fed by demand for new consumer 
durables. The similarity with Germany up to the first oil shock is especially close–Japanese 
industry made rapid technical progress in chemicals, iron and steel, paper and pulp, and in 
transport machinery. Japan, like Germany, accumulated a great deal of capital with its high 
savings rate, and ended up having a capital-to-labor ratio of almost twice that in the United States, 
despite the ongoing increase in manufacturing hours worked. 
                                                                 
4 MITI White Paper on International Trade 1999 characterized matters: “[T]he lack of depth in capital 
supply – for example in the setting of interest [rate] levels in line with risk – in terms of the various capital 
intermediation routes obstructs the smooth supply of capital to companies with credit ratings below a 
certain level, such as middle-ranked and small and medium companies [as well as credit for] new 
businesses, all of which have limited physical mortgage capacity.”  And the Japanese banking system, 
which depended upon land collateral as the basis for all credit assessments, ceased to lend when the real 
estate market collapsed, except to rollover bad debt to borrowers who had only land as repayment.   8
From 1972-90, Japanese growth continued at higher than American or even European 
rates, but slowed noticeably. There is some dispute over whether this limited slowing can be 
attributed to the oil shocks as a deus ex machina in Japan, the way the oil shocks seem to have 
been associated with the first remarked upon decline in productivity growth in the United States 
and elsewhere around the mid-1970s
5. In any event, there were other factors at work, just as in the 
United States it became clear that the actual productivity decline began before the oil shock. At 
some point in the 1970s, Japan reached the technological frontier in many advanced 
manufacturing sectors, having “caught up” to the United States, or even surpassed it in some of 
those considered high-tech. Also, the shift of employment from agriculture to manufacturing and 
the shift in residence from rural to urban, was largely completed. Both of these contributed to a 
decline in the “easy” ways to add growth.  
Meanwhile, Japan actually adapted well to the aftermath of the oil shock, exporting large 
quantities of more fuel-efficient machinery and autos to both the West and to newly developing 
East Asia.  By the mid-1980s, people believed that the price of land could never go down in 
Japan, that Japanese exporters would dominate world markets in many leading industries on an 
ongoing basis, and that Japanese investors would acquire significant ownership over much of the 
world’s prized assets. These were the days of ‘Japan as Number One’. 
The current sense of crisis in Japan and abroad about the Japanese economy did not arise 
until after the aborted recovery of 1996–in fact, until then positive perceptions about the Japanese 
economy remained prevalent on both sides of the Pacific. This was understandable given the not-
unprecedented nature of the 1991-95 slowdown, the ability to blame it temporarily on the yen’s 
rise, and the apparent signs of recovery in 1996 following one program of true government fiscal 
stimulus. The severe but normal downturn of the 1990s only persisted and got worse due to the 
government ignoring mounting financial fragility and pursuing procyclical monetary and fiscal 
policies (Posen 1998). In particular, the combination of a consumption tax increase in April 1997 
and the contractionary effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, as well as a mounting pile of bad 
bank loans in excess of 10 percent of GDP, cut off a nascent recovery, which started in 1996
6. 
The surprise collapses in November 1997 of Yamaichi Securities, one of four major securities 
houses in Japan, and of Hokkaido Tokashokku Bank, the dominant bank on the north home island 
and one of the top 20 banks–despite the efforts of regulators at the time to maintain a convoy 
system keeping all banks afloat and all problems hidden–fed a financial near-panic among 
                                                                 
5 The leading figures in this debate over the causes of Japan’s first slowdown were Dale Jorgenson on the 
oil shock side and Angus Maddison arguing against such an attribution. 
6 Boltho and Corbett (2000) note that 35 percent of Japanese exports went to the crisis countries before 
mid-1997, and these declined by 27 percent after the crisis hit, a direct loss of 1.5 pervent of Japanese GDP.   9
Japanese savers, as well as among counterparties with Japanese banks. The resulting second 
official recession lasted from June 1997 to December 1998. 
From mid-1997 through the first quarter of 1999, there was a breakdown in Japanese 
financial markets-- collapse of credit growth, banks subject to very high “Japan premia” in 
interbank markets (when they could borrow at all), rise in the public’s holdings of currency 
relative to bank deposits (indicating disintermediation from the banking system), and a 
deflationary trend on all available measures that continues through today
7 (see table 3). Land 
prices declined unremittingly throughout the period, while the stock market declined by double-
digit amounts in two of the last three years (and again in 2000 to date). The combination of 
deflation and financial fragility created a vicious cycle of mounting real debt, foreclosed but 
unsold collateral, and adverse selection in credit markets
8. The situation only stabilized with the 
implementation of major financial reforms and recapitalization of part of the banking system in 
the first quarter of 1999–but no more than stabilized, with over half of the Japanese banking 
system still inadequately capitalized, untransparent accounting of nonperforming loans, and 
therefore banks rolling over bad loans while making risky choices with new credits (gambling on 
resurrection). 
On the real side of the economy, Japanese unemployment has risen to exceed that in the 
United States beginning in mid-1998, going from 2.3 percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent in mid-2000. 
While the American unemployment levels are likely to rise again as the cycle turns down, Japan 
is estimated to have sufficient “hidden” unemployment, that is, employees officially still on the 
payroll of firms who do little productive work and who in some instances are not even paid, 
which doubles the national unemployment rate. Changing exchange rates make it difficult to 
compare levels of wealth and income between countries, but real per capita GDP measured on 
domestic data has grown at only a 0.6 percent compound rate since 1990 in Japan, while the rate 
of growth in US real per capita income has been nearly three times as great (1.7 percent 
compound annual rate) over the same period. In the two major “Global Competitiveness 
Surveys,” Japan’s position has declined throughout the 1990s
9.  
As of this writing, annual Japanese household savings has risen to 13 percent of GDP, 
while in the United States, the share of private savings out of annual income has sunk toward or 
                                                                 
7 In Japan, as in all economies using standard baskets to compute deflators, there is an inherent positive 
bias in the CPI and other price indices.  This bias is on the order of 1.0-1.5 percent in Japan, according to 
the Bank of Japan’s own calculations, meaning effective deflation arguably has been present since 1992. 
8 See the chapters by Bernanke, Glauber, Shimizu, and Posen in Mikitani and Posen, eds. (2000). 
9 The IMD survey ranked Japan as the most competitive economy in the world through the early 1990s, 
downgraded it to #4 in 1995, and to #17 in 2000; the World Economic Forum had already dropped Japan to 
#13 by 1996, and the economy fell further in the rankings to #21 in the 2000 survey.   10 
even below zero. Of course, public-sector savings in the two countries have shown divergences in 
the opposite direction over the decade, with the US Federal Government moving into surplus, and 
the Japanese government going past Italy and Belgium in terms of high gross debt-to-GDP 
ratios
10 (see table 4). This erosion of the Japanese government’s balance sheet has more to do 
with declining tax revenues in a time of declining growth than with any ambitious public 
spending or tax cut programs (always far more promised than implemented, with the exception of 
September 1998).  
 
What This Means for Japan  
The mainstream macroeconomic explanation for Japanese economic decline in the 1990s is a 
combination of a normal negative demand shock, an excessive financial multiplier due to bad 
loans feeding back into the broader economy through connected lending and regulatory 
forbearance, and severe fiscal and monetary policy missteps turning that into debt-deflation. 
Consistent with this view, there has been no decline in Japanese purchasing power or terms-of-
trade (see table 3). Unemployment has risen, and capacity utilization has declined, while prices 
have fallen. Real interest rates have declined, despite the deflation, consistent with a lack of 
demand for investment (see table 5). The rate of business creation has declined in Japan, with the 
number of start-ups now growing more slowly than the number of business bankruptcies and 
closures. In fact, that imbalance was already true even in the bubble years of the late 1980s, when 
the number of business closures per year increased more rapidly than the number of business 
start-ups (see table 6). The trends in “creative destruction” in the Japanese economy display no 
sharp break with long-run trends, even taking into account the cyclical downturn.  
In short, there is no evidence of a direct hit to Japanese productive capability or to the 
basic structures of the Japanese economy from what it was when it was idolized in the late 1980s. 
There is no question that productivity growth has declined in Japan in the 1990s (see tables 7 and 
8). According to the MITI White Paper on International Trade 1998, total factor productivity 
stagnated from 1990-97, after growing by 1 percent a year in the 1980s. But measured 
productivity performance is procyclical in most economies, because when there is an economic 
slowdown, firms do not shed labor as rapidly as output falls
11. In Japan, firms have proven 
especially reluctant to let workers go even as production has been cut, exacerbating this effect. It 
                                                                 
10 It should be noted, however, that Japanese government net debt is not necessarily or even obviously on 
an unsustainable path since all of the debt is denominated in yen, less than 6 percent of the debt is held 
abroad, and close to a third of the government debt is held by public agencies themselves. 
11 See the discussion of the importance of cyclical factors in the upswing in productivity in the United 
States in Gordon (2001).   11 
is worth noting that the estimates of both Wolff (1999) and OECD (2000) indicate that the 
difference between Japanese and US (or German) labor productivity growth only widens starting 
in 1995, after the American boom and the Japanese second recession/financial breakdown began 
(see table 8).  
Furthermore, for a large, diversified, and developed economy like Japan, a negative 
supply shock (i.e., a decline in productive capacity rather than an idling of extant capacity) should 
be reflected in a shift in the relative productivity of differing sectors. While there is ample 
evidence of an ongoing and substantial difference between the average productivity levels of the 
Japanese export manufacturing sector and of the rest of the economy (a fact I discuss at more 
length in section D below), there is no evidence of a change in those relative levels in the 1990s, 
or an abrupt shift in any Japanese sector’s competitiveness versus the rest of the world. As seen in 
table 7, the difference between average annual TFP growth rates in the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors in the 1990s (2.1 percent) fell between the difference seen in the 1980s 
(1.6 percent) and in the 1970s (3.1 percent), and this was not the first decade in which 
nonmanufacturing productivity stagnated. 
Returning to the fundamentals of growth as seen in the Solow growth model, extended by 
later endogenous growth researchers, provides a needed bit of perspective on stories of Japanese 
decline. In the recent literature on economic growth, such factors as initial GDP per capita (as a 
measure of convergence), schooling and life expectancy of workers (as proxies for human 
capital), national savings, rule of law and democracy (as measures of respect for property rights), 
and inflation and government consumption (as distortions or discouragements of investment) are 
significant predictors of countries’ growth rates. Writing in 1996, the noted free market 
economist Robert Barro predicted a 3.2 percent annual real per capita growth rate for Japan for 
1996-2000, on the basis of his main cross sectional panel estimates, and Japan’s high initial 
scores, on these growth fundamentals
12. 
Although such a result might lead one to be skeptical of the practical utility of the current 
state of economic growth research, it underlines just how difficult it is to say that Japan has bad, 
let alone declining, “fundamentals” for growth. The combined Solow and endogenous growth 
models take into account the supply of physical capital, of human capital (i.e., the quality 
adjusted supply of labor), the starting level of technology, the state of government, and the social 
structure. Since economic growth is composed of capital inputs, labor inputs, and technological 
                                                                 
12 See Barro (1997).  His forecasts had a 2 percent (two standard deviation) margin of error–the US forecast 
was almost that much below Japan’s, and Japan’s forecast growth rate exceeded that of almost all other 
OECD economies.   12 
progress, this would seem to about cover it
13.  Writing a few years later, and with the benefit of a 
few more years data, Hartnett and Higgins (2000) still find that Japan scores high on all of these 
except government policy (see table 9). The particular government policy measure, which they 
identify, however, includes monetary policy and the organization of the central bank, hardly deep 
structures (and ones on which Japan has shifted noticeably since April 1998). 
The OECD has correctly emphasized the ability of structural reform, particularly in the 
financial, retail, and utilities sectors, to raise Japan’s long-term growth rate (e.g., OECD [1998]), 
much as it has advocated liberalization for many other countries. Noting this opportunity for 
efficiency gains, however, does not explain why the same Japanese financial system did not 
appear to be a binding constraint on Japan’s higher growth rate in the 1950-89 period
14. In other 
words, the closer one looks at Japan in the 1990s , the more it becomes apparent that although the 
macroeconomic performance declined sharply and persistently, the causes were limited to the 
demand side and macroeconomic and financial policy mistakes.  
The costliest recession in an advanced economy since the 1950 recession does not 
indicate a long-term, structural decline in potential output – let alone technological regress. If it 
did, the output gap in Japan would be rapidly closing as growth has picked up to around 2 percent 
in 1999-2000, but instead unemployment continues to rise, wages and prices continue to fall, and 
capacity remains unused, all of which indicates the opposite (see table 10)
15. There is no obvious 
evidence of a structural break from the Japan that put up stellar macroeconomic performance in 
                                                                 
13 There is some popular concern that Japanese demographics are working against growth, with the world’s 
most rapidly aging population.  While this is of course literally true, given that growth in labor supply is 
one of the components of economic growth, it should not be a focus of this discussion.  For one thing, there 
are a number of currently untapped resources for Japanese labor (such as underemployment of women, and 
relatively early retirement ages given high life expectancies), as well as possibilities for allowing guest 
workers or limited immigration, which could rapidly respond to any labor constraint.  Another issue is that 
from the point of view of economic welfare, our concern is with per capita real income growth, which is 
usually enhanced by a declining population.  In any event, for the period ten years prior and ten years after 
the present day, Japanese net population growth is projected to be effectively zero, so talking about changes 
in aggregate growth and in per capita income growth are equivalent. 
14 Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) convincingly argue that Japan succeeded in the postwar decades despite the 
drag of an inefficient ‘main bank system’, and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) provide a great deal of evidence 
on the development of Japanese corporate finance consistent with this view.  While improvements in the 
Japanese financial system are sufficient to improve growth, they are not necessary to do so – and therefore 
lack of such improvements cannot be to blame for the Japanese growth slowdown (except in the different 
sense that a mismanaged financial crisis had high costs, which is not a statement about potential growth). 
15 It should be noted that an average of 38 different predictions of Japan’s long-term potential growth rate 
compiled in 1999 by the high-level Prime Minister’s Committee for Strategic Economic Priorities was 2.1 
percent per annum [see Nihon Keizai Saisei eno Senryaku (The Strategy for Reviving the Japanese 
Economy) (1999)], not much changed from a few years before.  Meanwhile, both the OECD and the Bank 
of Japan have recently downgraded their estimates of Japanese potential, to 1.25 percent and 1 percent 
respectively.  Posen (2001) offers an argument for why potential growth actually rose to around 2.5 percent 
in Japan in 1998-2000, and some explanation for why alternative methods of measurement might come to 
the opposite signed conclusion.   13 
the 1970s and 1980s, and historically unprecedented growth prior to catching up and urbanizing 
in the 1950s and 1960s, once technological convergence and the transition to a modern economy 
are controlled for. This raises important puzzles about the relationship between technological 
innovation and economic growth in the Japanese context. 
 




Clarifying the Image of the Japanese National Innovation System 
The Japanese system of innovation and economic development had become the stuff of legend by 
the time that Japanese national income per capita approached American levels at the end of the 
1980s. The vast literature, which emerged to study it on both sides of the Pacific, identified 
several key attributes of the system, many of which were exaggerated in the more popular press. 
Goto and Odagiri (1993, 1997) give the mainstream list of the major characteristics that can be 
documented. The primary emphasis of the Japanese system is on continuous improvement of 
production processes as well as of products in publicly identified important or strategic industries, 
of which steel, automobiles, and electronics were the most notable in the postwar period. Creation 
of wholly new products or lines of business was not considered to be a primary goal --though 
more entrepreneurship did arise than is often credited (Johnstone [1999]). This improvement in 
the selected industries would generally begin with the importation of key technologies from 
abroad and the setting of ambitious industrial standards by the Japanese government and 
industry
17.  
The approach never amounted to “picking winners” of specific companies by the 
powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or other agencies in the sense that 
American observers sometimes believed. Both government contracts and trade protection were 
employed at early stages of development in a few chosen sectors to provide a minimum market 
size, but usually for a number of domestic companies. MITI would encourage with some limited 
public seed money joint research and development efforts among those invited companies. 
Personnel management within these companies and the Japanese educational system encouraged 
the training of broadly qualified engineers (rather than specialized research scientists), and the 
seniority system with lifetime employment emphasized the retention and transmission of 
                                                                 
16 The distinction made between “inputs” to innovation in this section, and “outputs” in the next, is based 
on distinguishing between institutional frameworks that determine which R&D activities get pursued, and 
the amount of innovative products and processes that come out of these activities. 
17 Lee, et al (1998) argue that (mostly domestic) user firms’ two-way interaction with Japanese capital 
goods producers fed innovation through integration and specialization.   14 
specialized skills relevant to the company’s products. The movement of these engineers between 
line production and management encouraged their bringing of incremental practical 
improvements into corporate awareness and eventual company-wide implementation
18. In the 
words of the National Industrial Technology Strategy Development Commission (NITSDC) set 
up by the Japanese government: 
 
Until recently, Japanese enterprises achieved and maintained competitiveness by introducing basic 
industrial technologies from Western nations to achieve ‘process innovation’ (i.e., technically 
enhancing manufacturing processes), which dramatically upgraded productivity and product 
quality. Underlying this success were uniform standards of education, high workforce morale, 
long-term investment in human resources, and teamwork between manufacturing employees and 
management. In short, Japan made full use of the strengths of Japanese society and Japanese 
business management systems. (NITSDC [1999], 8) 
 
These practices on the part of government and industry to promote innovation easily co-existed 
with the more general principles of corporate organization in Japan: relationship financing of 
corporations through long-term bank lending, “lifetime” employment for many workers and 
limited labor mobility for all workers (with the attendant pros and cons), flexible shop floor 
teamwork and just-in-time inventory, widespread government regulation limiting entry and exit 
of businesses from various sectors, and primacy of insider stakeholder relationships over 
transparent accounting and shareholder value. From the perspective of the United States in 2000, 
for most observers these would all sound like disadvantages (with the exception of worker teams 
and just-in-time inventory, whose adoption is seen as contributing to the rise in US productivity)–
what is important is that these broader characteristics of Japanese industry were just as prevalent 
in the glory years of 1950-80 as they have been in the 1990s
19.  
What has recently come to light about the postwar Japanese innovation system is the 
degree to which domestic competition among firms in high-tech sectors occurred and even was 
encouraged, despite the status quo biases of the system. Individual entrepreneurship, while hardly 
encouraged, was a significant factor in Japanese technological development as well. For example, 
Fransman (1999) documents the start of what he calls “controlled competition” in the electronics 
and telecommunications industry in the efforts of the Imperial Ministry of Communications in the 
1920s and 1930s to have multiple, albeit chosen, suppliers for Japan’s developing telecom 
                                                                 
18 Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) claim that it is as much tacit knowledge within an organization as explicit, 
and therefore appropriable, knowledge, which gives corporations creativity.  Procedures and manuals only 
take one so far in producing new technologies, but Japanese companies also benefit from workers with 
broad internal experience that cumulates by transmission, and results in innovation. 
19 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) make an interesting historical argument that what they call “Keiretsu 
financing,” the Main Bank relationship financing of industry, was a postwar creation that started to dissolve 
by 1980.   15 
infrastructure (as opposed to the United States’ de facto monopoly for Western Electric). The big 
four Japanese electronics and telecom companies of today (NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Oki) trace 
their roots to the late 19
th century, but really were the result of mergers, the entry and exit of 
foreign joint ventures (with Siemens and Western Electric, for example), and shifting government 
contracts from the telephone monopoly NTT
20.  
The history of the Japanese automobile industry, home to some of the world’s greatest 
production innovations, is one of great competition, of corporate entry and exit and re-entry, and 
of individual inventors and entrepreneurs, despite government activism to develop auto 
production. Ten domestic firms tried to get in to the auto business before the end of the 1920s, 
and failed, with only the government-supported (through Army purchases) Dat staying in, and 
still Ford and GM dominated the Japanese market
21. In 1932, the predecessor of MITI urged three 
specific companies to begin new efforts, resulting in the survival of one firm (Isuzu), and several 
not sponsored by MITI got in. Toyota Motors, funded by Toyota Looms, began as a small-scale 
non-zaibatsu firm responding to a risk-taking entrepreneur’s vision, without government support. 
After 1950, both Honda and Suzuki became major automotive producers after their individual 
owners branched out from motorcycles and did so without any public-sector encouragement (let 
alone foreign exchange credits with which to purchase technology, or government procurement 
contracts). Meanwhile, Daihatsu eventually was acquired by Toyota in an example of competitive 
mergers. Mitsubishi Motors entered and re-entered the Japanese automobile market repeatedly as 
both a government favorite and a member of a major keiretsu family, and still failed to gain a 
leading domestic market share, let alone a major piece of the export market
22. 
What probably left the greatest impression to outside observers of the Japanese 
government picking winners in technologies and companies, were the attempts of MITI to create 
coordinated research efforts in the electronics industry, backstopped by trade policy. The 
perceived success of the efforts in the cases of the Japanese mainframe computer industry and of 
the development of very large-scale integrated circuits (VLSI) project gave rise to the calls in the 
                                                                 
20 In his introduction, Fransman (1999, p. 14) cites approvingly an apparently self-translated passage from a 
1994 Japanese language research volume on “The Industrial Policy of Japan” which reads: “All of 
participants in this [multi-author] project recognized that, excluding the brief period immediately after the 
end of the war, the foundation of rapid growth was competition operating through the price mechanism and 
a flourishing entrepreneurial spirit.  In opposition to the ‘Japan, Inc.’ thesis, it can even be said that the 
history of industrial policy in the principal postwar periods (in particular the 1950s and 1960s) has often 
been that the initiative and vitality of the private sector undermined the plans of government authorities to 
try to utilize direct intervention in the nature of ‘controls’.”  
21 See Goto and Odagiri (1993) 
22 Michael Porter’s discussion of Japan in The Competitive Advantage of Nations gives additional anecdotal 
evidence about the importance of domestic competition to Japanese technical progress and performance, 
arguing that Japan’s export success only came as a result of this competition.     16 
United States for the Sematech and HDTV government-led research programs (which themselves 
eventually were deemed failures).  
Even in these instances, however, the reality was less coordinated and government 
directed than the common perception. As Nakayama, et al. (1999) describe, in the early 1960s, 
Japan had six players in the computer industry, all but one of which partnered with a US firm. 
The innovative IBM System 360 and System 370 mainframe computers wiped out the 
competition in both the United States and Japan. The MITI Computer Systems Project of 1966-72 
to build a Japanese competitor or successor to the 360 did not function as planned. “[S]kepticism 
pervaded the engineering staffs from the [six selected] competing companies. It often happened in 
national projects like this that MITI’s endorsement was used to persuade corporate management 
to support in-house R&D, but technological exchange among [participating] companies was 
minimal .”
23 Eventually Fujitsu and Toshiba emerged as viable competitors to IBM in the 
computer hardware market, but three of the other six firms participating in the project got out of 
the computer business entirely, while a fourth stayed in only with the support of government 
purchases and never was an innovative player. 
Japanese firms did come to dominate the market for RAM and other integrated circuits on 
semiconductor chips in the 1990s, though control of the microprocessor market went back to the 
US producers Intel, Motorola, and others by the mid-1990s (and most RAM chip production 
moved offshore from Japan)
24. This dominance is often attributed to the success of MITI’s VLSI 
Project of 1976-80, based on the forecast that 1 megabit memory chips for general purpose 
computers would be a key electronics market segment. Even within the “Research Association” 
framework, MITI pursued a relatively decentralized course. Three laboratories (Computer Lab, 
NEC-Toshiba Information Systems Lab, and the VLSI Joint Lab) were set up, with the 
participation of an initial five companies (and a couple more added later). The brief of the joint 
work was to emphasize fundamentals, which in practice meant a focus on lofty far off projects 
(like the development of electron beam equipment). The truly practical next generation 
technologies, like photolithography methods for etching circuits on chips, were tightly held 
within the participating companies. In fact, the biggest impact may have been on those Japanese 
companies, like Canon and Nikon, which were not directly involved in the VLSI Project but 
received demanding requisitions for equipment to create inputs (like aligners for circuits). This is 
much the same as beneficial spillovers in the United States to contract suppliers of Department of 
Defense long-term research efforts. 
                                                                 
23 Nakayama, et al (1999), 44. 
24 See the chapter on innovation in the semiconductor industry in Nelson, et al. (2001).   17 
In any event, this was to be MITI’s last major success of this kind in the electronics 
industry (at least to date)
25. There were smaller Research Association-type projects pursued since 
1980, but “difficult[ies] arose for MITI with the diversification of the electronics technology, the 
maturation of Japanese industry, and the uncertainty of emerging technologies.” (Nakayama, et 
al. [1999], p. 47) The amount of government subsidies for private R&D research was already on a 
downward trend from 1960 through 1980, further indicating that the end of these projects was not 
a major difference between the Japanese innovation system of today and the recent past
26. Writing 
in 1993, when the Japanese system was still believed to be a model, Goto and Odagiri gave a very 
measured description of industrial policy’s role in promoting R&D: 
 
[F]or MITI, Research Associations have been a convenient way to distribute its subsidies to 
promote the technologies MITI (and particular firms) believed important, most notably 
semiconductors and computers, and have been used to avoid favoring particular firms and to 
minimize the cost of supervising the use of subsidies. From this viewpoint, it is not surprising that 
only two of the 87 associations had [actual] joint research facilities; in all other cases, each 
member firm simply took its share of research funds and carried out the research in its own 
laboratory. Therefore, how coordinated the research really was among particular firms within each 
Research Association is doubtful except for a few cases. The effectiveness of these Research 
Associations in generating new technologies is also doubtful…Research Associations’ 
productivity as measured by the number of patents divided by its R&D expenditures was 
considerably lower than that of [private] industries…” (Goto and Odagiri [1993], 88) 
 
Moreover, even in electronics, individual entrepreneurship played at least as great a role as 
government intervention in the development of Japanese capabilities. Throughout most of its rise, 
Toshiba had been an outsider as far as NTT’s procurement went, not becoming a member of the 
telephone monopoly’s equipment provider “family” until NTT’s privatization in 1985; Fujitsu 
only got into and stayed in the computer industry due to the efforts of a strong corporate chairman 
overruling the concerns of his upper management and board. Johnstone (1999) gives numerous 
examples of individual Japanese electronics entrepreneurs, not all that far removed from the 
garages of Hewlett and Packard, or of Jobs and Wozniak (though probably more crowded). As 
Johnstone documents, numerous Japanese physicists working in the electronics industry 
undertook their own transpacific exchanges and education efforts, and created both innovations 
and companies. The paradigmatic example is, of course, Sony, which began life as Tokyo 
Telecommunications Research Laboratories, with 20 employees in May 1946. Starting with a 
                                                                 
25 The “Fifth Generation Computer Project” which MITI started in 1981 as the next new technological goal 
was shut down a few years later with no visible results. 
26 Only a miniscule share of government spending in Japan is spent on industrial policy, let alone on 
promotion of innovation.  The vast bulk of public spending is on keeping dead sectors like agriculture and 
rural construction firms alive (and Diet members from the LDP re-elected).  The waste of public funds on 
redundant or useless infrastructure projects cannot be exaggerated (see Posen [1998]), but also cannot be   18 
small contract for recording equipment from the national broadcaster, NHK, and inspired by 
visits to the United States in the early 1950s, Sony’s two founders built the largest consumer 
electronics company in the world. Sony was one of many companies worldwide to license 
Western Electric’s transistor technology in 1953, but was the only one to gamble on creating 
transistor radios (which required the innovation of phosphorus doping the transistor to get 
reception in the radio frequency range)
27.  
There might be one important exception to the general characterization of the Japanese 
national innovation system as largely unchanged in the 1990s, and as less interventionist (and 
more competitive) than usually thought. That is the area of trade protection. By all appearances, 
Japan did engage in some rather aggressive infant industry protections and export promotion 
policies for autos, computers, and other domestic industries. And whatever the intent behind 
earlier barriers, there is no question that Japanese trade protection has declined in recent years 
through a combination of international trade agreements and US pressures. It is possible that 
while Japanese industrial policy may not have succeeded in directing innovation or picking 
winners consistently, earlier industrial policy efforts might still have given benefits by granting 
sufficient scale to exports of manufactured goods. 
The more careful evidence, however, points in the other direction. Lawrence and 
Weinstein (1999) show rather conclusively in a multi-year panel of industries that trade 
protection interfered with sectoral TFP growth in Japan (and Korea). Imports had a salutary effect 
on TFP in those Japanese industries where they were allowed in, with the resulting increase in 
competition and learning significantly feeding innovation as long as Japan was behind the 
technological frontier. In other words, trade protection did not nurture internationally competitive 
firms in Japan in the pre-1973 period, imports did. Meanwhile, Lawrence and Weinstein show 
that export success by industry is significantly correlated with productivity gains, not with 
protection or other industrial policy measures. It is still possible that economies of scale could 
emerge in a virtuous circle with high export growth. The key is that controlling for protection by 
industry or firm takes away nothing from the explanatory power. 
This result is consistent with the auto and electronics industries’ experiences, those being 
the two most important and successful Japanese export industries, and clearly industries that 
developed by importing technology and facing competition. So even if the Japanese 
government’s ability to engage in trade protection and export subsidization has declined in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
called in any way a subsidy of technical innovation – the way some defense spending in the United States 
can. 
27 In fact, MITI refused to give Sony the foreign exchange credits for the license, and Sony had to come up 
with the money on its own.   19 
1990s versus earlier decades, that shift cannot be the source of a negative change in the national 
innovation system because the most innovative sectors (as measured by TFP growth) were the 
industries not subject to these policies
28. Thus, in terms of the Japanese institutional framework 
for supporting innovation, the first puzzle of declining macroeconomic performance despite 
unchanging innovative inputs holds. 
 
Measurable Innovation Inputs Also Remain Steady 
The description of the unchanging framework of the Japanese national innovation system only 
takes us so far. Thinking in terms of the measurable building blocks for innovation–funds devoted 
to research and development, supply of technically skilled workers, communications and 
educational infrastructure, private sector allocation of R&D funds–allows us to also track whether 
Japan has kept the same innovation framework, but dedicated fewer resources to it, or used those 
resources in more wasteful ways. A drop off in innovation inputs prior to the economic downturn 
of the 1990s might help to explain the decline in growth, or a cutback in the funding and 
promotion on R&D as the downturn took hold might explain the persistence of slow growth. This 
remains plausible, though its importance must be limited given the aggregate level evidence 
outlined in the first section for why technical regress appears to be inconsistent with recent 
developments. 
The measured inputs to innovation in Japan, however, appear to have remained steady 
between the 1980s and the 1990s, along with the framework for utilizing them. Japan’s rate of 
R&D investment, as a percentage of annual GDP, has consistently been higher than that of 
Germany or the United States, running 2.80 percent on average from 1987-97 (see table 1). In 
other forms of research and development infrastructure, such as the number of internet hosts or 
personal computers per capita, Japan does lag behind the United States [see table 1]--but that 
should be consistent with a rise in the American growth rate (through IT capital deepening) in the 
most recent years, not a decline in the Japanese one. Germany, which lags similarly behind the 
United States on these metrics, saw its trend growth rate undiminished, though the relative growth 
                                                                 
28 Some earlier papers by David Weinstein and coauthors, on domestic industrial policy and on the 
Japanese financial system, advance the argument that the Japanese economy grew despite counter-
productive government interventions implemented during the high growth years, as Lawrence and 
Weinstein (1999) conclude with regard to trade protection specifically.  Posen (1998, chap. 6) takes much 
the same “success despite” view of the earlier periods of Japanese development, but also extends a similar 
argument to the Japanese decline in the 1990s, concluding that the decline was largely caused by new 
mistaken policies, not by longstanding institutions that were present through times good and bad.  See also 
McKinsey (2000, 1), “Surprisingly, we found that the Japanese economy was never as strong as it appeared 
to be during its glory days.  In fact, today’s woeful economic performance is not so much a reversal of 
fortune as a revelation of the holdovers of Japan’s success in the 1980s.”   20 
gap widened.  If “internet readiness” of the broader citizenry is the issue, the much higher 
Japanese per capita use of mobile phones–many of which now add wireless Internet services in 
Japan–should at least partially compensate for the lower level of PC usage. 
It is worth emphasizing that Japanese R&D funding, especially private corporate R&D 
funding, has continued to grow in the 1990s, even as total private investment has fluctuated, and 
for most part steeply declined. As seen in third panel of table 12, which shows the year-over-year 
percentage changes, both total and private sector R&D investment declined somewhat in 1993 
and 1994 immediately following the burst of the bubble, but grew strongly over the next four 
years. R&D funding in the public and university sectors was hit harder initially and responded 
more weakly, but showed a similar upward J-curve. It is also worth re-emphasizing that a far 
greater share of Japanese R&D is funded by the private sector than in the United States, despite 
the fact that the total share (in GDP) of R&D investment is consistently higher in Japan than in 
the United States. This differential is long-standing, and not merely the reflection of the lack of 
defense spending in Japan.  This bears out the picture given above of MITI and other 
government-sponsored “research associations” playing a relatively small role in the 
encouragement and direction of Japanese innovation versus the role played by private 
corporations. 
Considering the comparative distribution of R&D funds in the G3, Japan and the United 
States are actually reasonably similar in their relative weightings of basic versus applied research, 
with German R&D funding being more oriented toward basic research than either of the others 
(see table 13, as well as the discussion of the biases of German research networks in Siebert 
[2001]). Interestingly, research conducted in the Japanese university system tends to put a lower 
emphasis on basic research relative to applied engineering than in the United States or Germany. 
This is not a necessary result of the greater public (including defense) funding of research in the 
United States, since the larger share of self-funded private research in Japan could just as easily 
have freed up the universities to pursue more academic projects. What is clear is that in both 
source of funds and orientation of their use, Japanese R&D has been at least as focused on 
practical private-sector industrial problems as German or American R&D
29. 
What makes this bias toward private funding, and toward applied research even in 
universities, particularly odd for Japan, is the absence of a patenting or licensing framework for 
                                                                 
29 National Research Council (1999) documents that these differences between the United States and Japan 
in emphasis on basic research, on public versus private R&D funding, and on university-corporate 
cooperation are of long-standing.  See also the narrative discussions in Goto and Odagiri, eds. (1997), 
Fransman (1999), and Nakayama, et al. (1999), all of which give a similar description of a Japanese R&D 
focus on very applied engineering problems, even in the universities.   21 
universities to get revenues from inventions created, or for universities and companies to set up 
partnerships. Such profitable registrations and relationships have been common in the United 
States, especially since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Amendment in 1983 reducing the licensing 
fees allowing universities to keep revenues from patents developed on government contracts. In 
Japan, after much discussion, such a law was only passed in April 1998, as part of an effort to 
promote more cooperation between industries and universities. For purposes of the present 
discussion, however, the key point is that Japanese R&D funding did not become increasingly 
diverted from industrial concerns in the 1990s versus the earlier postwar period. If any change 
had occurred, it would have only pushed Japanese R&D further in what we would today consider 
the right direction of private funding and applied usefulness. 
A similar point can be made about Japan’s patent laws more generally. The extent of 
patent protection for innovators is a critical component in the willingness of companies to 
undertake large and risky investments needed for technological progress. In the postwar period, 
patent protection in Japan has been relatively weak as compared to American standards (though 
certainly world’s stronger than in most of the rest of Asia and some other OECD countries). In 
Japan, patent applications are made public within 18 months of filing, allowing competitors to 
copy and reverse engineer, even though the granting of patent rights can take years. The 
pendency period is only seven years and the legal code puts a narrower scope on the claims 
owners can make about what their invention covers. Since the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations concluded in 1994, Japanese patent protection was extended to 20 years, English 
language applications for Japanese patents were deemed acceptable, and the Japanese patent 
model has converged on international norms
30. As in other aspects of the Japanese innovation 
system, on this measure of patent rights, Japan exhibited little variation over the periods of high 
and low performance, and what change occurred was in what would be considered the 
constructive direction. 
Even taking into account the large gross amount of finance provided for R&D in Japan, 
and the fact that it is largely provided by private-sector sources, the efficiency of the way that 
capital gets allocated to specific projects, and whether that allocation process changed over time, 
is still an open question. Of particular concern is the flow of funds to newer firms and start-ups. 
Although there have been examples of important businesses arising from individual entrepreneurs 
or small partnerships in postwar Japan, such as Sony and Honda, most observers of the Japanese 
                                                                 
30 The acceptance of English language patent applications is doubly important – of course, it eases the 
ability of foreigners to make claims for patent protection of their innovations in Japan, but it also eases the 
process of application for most hard scientists, given the use of English as the language of work in most 
technical fields.   22 
economy have expressed concern about the willingness of the “Main Bank system” of Japan to 
shuttle funds to small and medium enterprises. SMEs unaffiliated with supplier networks to larger 
firms, let alone keiretsu, are thought to be often shut out, even though such independents are 
probably the source of many innovative advances. And like almost every other developed 
economy, the culture and practice of venture capital in Japan is thought to exhibit far less vitality 
than in the United States. 
The flip side of who gets the finance is how borrowing firms get monitored in their 
activities. The OECD (1995) analysis of National Systems for Financing Innovation gives a good 
description of the widely perceived differences between American-style “short-termism” and a 
Japanese or continental European “corporate governance” on both sides of the 
allocation/monitoring coin
31. The Japanese monitoring approach was held to have the benefit of 
maintaining funding through a firm’s temporary liquidity problems, because involved 
stakeholding lenders would be more able to see the actual promise of current investments beyond 
current cash-flow; the relationship banking approach also was hoped to preclude some excessive 
risk taking on the part of borrowing firms, which those firms funded largely by (collateral and 
monitor free) equity might engage in
32. These claimed advantages were not only offset by the 
putative lending biases against new entrants, listed above, but also the difficulties of firms making 
a liquid exit when needed from a web of cross-shareholdings and large scale lending, where 
merger activity was largely absent. 
In practice, the system of corporate finance in Japan was the aspect of the Japanese 
economic system to have undergone the most profound–though still partial –transformation in the 
last 20 years
33. Interestingly, it has been mostly in the direction of greater liberalization and 
securitization, starting with a round of deregulation in 1984-1986, which allowed major 
nonfinancial firms to issue bonds and commercial paper (rather than to depend upon banks), and 
gave a broader range of companies better access to capital markets. Between 1984 and 1990, the 
share of bonds in corporate liabilities doubled (from 4 to 8 percent), while the amount of bank 
lending remained stable at around 60 percent [see table 14]. This aggregate picture of the 
corporate sector masks an enormous distributional shift, with the biggest corporations radically 
cutting back their dependence on bank loans, and hundreds of non-keiretsu affiliated small- and 
                                                                 
31 A cautionary reminder is in order, that as late as 1992, the Harvard Business Review and MIT’s Made In 
America project, as well as the US Government’s Competitiveness Policy Council, were emphasizing the 
purported advantages of “patient” Japanese corporate finance through bank lending, as opposed to the 
“short-termism” of American stock market based financing.  This was held to be especially true for 
allowing investment to take a long-term perspective on such matters as research and development.  
32 Aoki and Patrick, eds., (1994) makes the academic case in favor of the Japanese Main Bank system.   23 
medium-sized enterprises [SMEs] getting new access to bank credit on the basis of land collateral 
rather than evaluation of credit worthiness (OECD [1995] and Shimizu [2000]).  
This partial deregulation led to deposit-rich banks losing their highest quality corporate 
borrowers. The banks’ diversification of their loan portfolios declined along with average quality 
as the SMEs all offered the same form of collateral, and similar correlations with the business 
cycle. With both banks and nonbank enterprises using loans based on land price increases to 
purchase equities, the partial deregulation of Japanese banks was a major source of the land and 
stock market bubble of the late 1980s, and was the primary cause of Japan’s eventual banking 
crisis in the 1990s. For purposes of this paper’s investigations, what is worth noting is that from 
1984 until the credit crunch in 1997, when banks’ cost of loanable funds and level of 
nonperforming loans rose sharply, availability of credit to new firms rose, and the cost of capital 
to established firms fell. If anything, there was overinvestment in capital projects in corporate 
Japan, right through the mid-1990s when bad loans were repeatedly rolled over (rather than 
foreclosed and written down) due to moral hazard on the part of below-adequacy or even 
negatively capitalized banks
34.  
Thus, even though the Japanese bank-based financial system clearly did great harm to the 
macroeconomy as a whole in the 1990s, and probably was not helpful in prior years
35, it would 
seem to have been at least as supportive of financing innovation in recent years as it was in the 
past.  Living up to some of the claims made for benefits of a long time-horizon for investment 
from relationship banking put forward during Japan’s heyday, major Japanese corporations 
sustained the financing of R&D activities throughout even the investment and growth downturns 
of the 1990s. It is clear that given the limited share of innovative activities in economic 
performance, and the costs of rolling-over unproductive investments, on balance such a financial 
system is a drag on the economy, even if R&D funding is stabilized by it. 
Moreover, the experience of the 1990s has demonstrated the continued bias of 
relationship lenders in the Japanese financial system in favor of those who have already 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
33 A much more detailed account of the developments summarized in this and the following photograph can 
be found in Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) and Mikitani and Posen, eds., (2000). 
34 Even though aggregate investment did clearly decline in the early 1990s (see table 1), the fact that 
problem loans were rolled over rather than called for the most part meant that capital losses were not 
recognized at the borrowing firms, and so their investments did not decline anywhere near as much as they 
should have.  Moreover, because the largest firms had already largely left the banking system for their 
major financing needs, and the application of tighter lending standards/bank recapitalization has only been 
extended to part of the Japanese banking system, SMEs have been the major recipients of this largesse. 
35 Why else would so many strong non-financial firms, when given the opportunity to exit banking 
relationships in the mid-1980s, have done so?  Why else would so many SMEs take advantage of new 
opportunities to borrow if they had not been credit constrained in the past?  See Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Schafstein (1990) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998).    24 
borrowed, and against outsider firms. Even as the pool of who was on the inside, able to gain 
financing, rose in membership and declined in quality from 1984 onwards, the criteria for lending 
were biased backward, looking toward SMEs with previously accumulated assets (particularly 
land) and relationships (e.g., as suppliers to established firms). Start-ups with the intangible assets 
and future customers associated with new products or ideas were shut out (in contrast to the 
venture capital industry and the high p/e ratios for new firms in the United States). Thus, there 
remains a large potential for missed innovative investment opportunities in Japan, even while 
overall R&D spending is maintained through economic downturns. Japanese bankruptcy law, 
which as one would expect puts a great deal of power into the hands of debt holders, and gives 
strong incentives not to declare bankruptcy, additionally constrains risk-taking behavior by 
lenders and by potential heads of start-ups
36. 
Japan has consistently had a lower rate of both business start-ups and bankruptcies than 
the United States, which sets the benchmark for pace of corporate “creative destruction.” From 
1981-96, an annual average of 4 to 5 percent of the total number of business establishments in 
Japan were started, and a comparable number were closed
37 (Tanaka [2000])–in the United States 
over the same period, business openings ranged from 13 to 15 percent of the total number of 
establishments every year, and closures ranged from 11 to 13 percent. Of course, this churning of 
business firms in the United States consists mostly of small service and retail sector companies 
(restaurants, frame shops, contractors), not high-tech start-ups and failures, and similarly for 
Japan. So a steady rise in the number of firms being allowed to exit from the Japanese business 
sector is probably a healthy development for the economy as a whole
38. For innovation the 
question is how many risky bets get backed to start-up, even if that is a small proportion of total 
new businesses. 
As already mentioned, the Japanese venture capital situation is far less developed than 
that of the United States. In 1996, for example, 75 percent of the outside funding for new ventures 
came from the banking system or other established companies in Japan and none from pension 
funds or endowment investors, while in the US 60 percent came from those latter two sources 
                                                                 
36 Among the more off-putting aspects of Japanese bankruptcy law are that: creditors holding more than 10 
percent of equity can declare for the firm, on the condition that the creditors believe the debtors will be 
unable to pay; there is only limited relief from creditors during reorganization, and no official receiver is 
appointed until the reorganization is complete; and the scope of the debtors’ assets protected from 
confiscation is very narrow, limited to clothing, furniture, and other everyday items. 
37 Table 6 shows the growth rates in these numbers, with bankruptcies increasing faster than start-ups in 
both the 1980s and 1990s 
38 I say, “allowed to exit” consciously, given the legal, public, financial, and informal networks, which 
constrain the free entry and exit of businesses from sectors in Japan.  Ideally, this would be an impersonal 
market outcome, not a set of conscious decisions, but that is not yet the case for much of the economy.   25 
(the more traditional angels of equity) and only 23 percent came from established corporations or 
banks [see Table 15]. A survey in 1999 by Japan’s National Life Finance Corporation found that 
family, friends, and relatives provided 42 percent of the total initial finance for start-ups, and 
financial firms and established corporations 35 percent (i.e., 87 percent of the outside funding). 
As seen in the second and third panels of Table 15 [from Weitzman (1999)], the Japanese venture 
capital sector, in addition to playing a smaller role, also tends to get in much later in a company’s 
development (77 percent of funding occurs after five years, versus 49 percent in the United 
States), and this has resulted in a much smaller number of new firms making it all the way onto 
Over-the-counter stockmarket listings (14 percent as many in Japan as in the United States, while 
the Japanese economy is now about 40 percent of the size of the US economy).  
The underdevelopment of venture capital is an acknowledged concern by various 
Japanese government agencies. The New Business Development division of MITI (2000) notes 
disapprovingly that in FY1999 the average amount of a given venture capital stake given to a 
start-up was 45 million yen in Japan, or about $400,000, while the average stake put up by an 
American venture capitalist was twelve times as much, or $4.9million. This is attributed in part to 
the absence of pension funds and the like engaging in investment at all, or in venture capital 
specifically in Japan. “If Japan’s pension funds invested 2-3 percent of their total managed assets 
in venture capital investments on par with the US situation in the 1980s, it would create 5 trillion 
yen [about 1 percent of a year’s GDP] in venture capital, or five to six times more than the total 
amount of outstanding venture capital funds [in Japan] today.”
39 While this emphasizes the sense 
of innovative opportunities missed by the Japanese financial system, it again raises an issue, 
which cannot be said to have changed for the worse as a prelude to or concurrent with the 
slowdown in the 1990s, or makes Japan noticeably different from other OECD economies. On the 
availability of venture capital, it is the United States that is an (positive) outlier. 
The final measurable input into the previously described Japanese national innovation 
system is that of labor and human capital. This is the one area where it could be argued that the 
amount of a needed factor in the production of innovation, in this case, of appropriately skilled 
labor, has declined in the 1990s versus the past. Japanese primary and secondary education 
remains of high quality and essentially universal.
40 The number of students going on to higher 
education has risen in recent years, rising from 36.1 percent in 1987 to 47.3 percent in 1997, a 
                                                                 
39 New Business Development (2000) 
40 In 1997, 96.8 percent of Japanese students 15 and older went on to (three-year) high school, and were 
taught the rigorous nationally approved curriculum.  It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider 
whether the common portrayal of Japanese education as rigid, emphasizing memorization and conformity,   26 
ratio comparable to that in the United States--Graduate education, however, lags behind with the 
number of graduate students in Japan amounting to only 6.6 percent of the number of 
undergraduates, as opposed to 13.2 percent in the United States.
41  
Turning specifically to training for technological innovation, the Japanese university 
system curriculum in science and engineering is consistent with its use of R&D funds, described 
above: very applied studies are given relative weight over training in basic science, but 
connections with the private-sector are scarce. This is also the mirror image of most science and 
engineering education in the United States In fact, private industry’s funding of university 
research in Japan almost completely stopped in the 1970s, and the government took active steps 
to encourage its limited revival in the 1990s (many Japanese scholars and students jealously 
observed Japanese businesses’ funding of research laboratories and university programs in US 
science and engineering schools). 
Perhaps as a result, the old system of each professor as an autonomous unit (koza) has 
survived, which keeps graduate students and junior faculty as disciples for long periods, and 
encourages incremental progress on the full professor’s oft-lagging ongoing research agenda 
(Nakayama, et al. [1999]). Faculty members are recruited for the top schools from within, with no 
value put (and probably some sanction) on outside work or consulting experience in the private 
sector, while the lower-tier schools tend to hire faculty from the higher-ranking universities when 
they retire
42.  
It is therefore no wonder that most Japanese firms believe they have to offer a year or 
more of “relevant” training to even Masters of Engineering graduates after hiring them. 
Meanwhile, given the age profile of the faculty, the lack of corporate relationships, and the status 
quo bias, it should come as no surprise that the Japanese universities are significantly behind their 
American counterparts (and the Japanese private sector) in working on new IT technologies. The 
University of Tokyo, the nation’s most prestigious school of higher education, does not even have 
an IT department, and MITI projects a shortage of 200,000 information/computer technology 
engineers in the coming years
43 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and stifling creativity holds true, and how much this detracts from the wide range of knowledge conveyed 
to students. 
41 Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture data from Comparison of International Educational 
Indices (Japanese data is from 1995, U.S. data is from 1992). 
42 This cascade of older professors is recognized and encouraged by the differing retirement ages for faculty 
across universities.  University of Tokyo and Tokyo Institute of Technology at the top have a retirement 
age of 60, the remaining quality public universities have retirement ages of 63, and the private universities 
have retirement ages of 70 or more. 
43 “Japan finds the powerhouse empty of skilled IT workers,” Michiyo Nakamoto and Alexandra Harney, 
Financial Times, 10 August 2000, 12.   27 
Of course, the US education system has also left the American economy short of skilled 
engineers and scientists, and the government has responded to business demands by increasing 
the immigration visas for such workers to hundreds of thousands per year. Japan has begun down 
that road, but the number of foreign engineers in Japan in 1999 totaled only 15,700 (up from only 
3,400 in 1991). It is in the area of skilled labor where Japan’s innovation inputs may indeed be 
falling short in the 1990s, though this should still more explain the inability to keep up with US 
advances than with a decline of innovation (unless we believe IT innovation to be the only field 
where major advances can be made at present). The ongoing lack of both skilled and unskilled 
labor inputs, likely to worsen as Japan gets older, is a constraint on high-technology production as 
well as on the economy as a whole. Of course, greater utilization of women in the Japanese 
workforce, and the raising of the retirement age for already very long-lived and healthy Japanese 
workers, could combine with increased immigration or guest-workers to address this shortfall. 
INDEPENDENCE OF INNOVATION OUTPUTS FROM MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
The relationship between technological innovation and national economic performance is likely 
to be a two-way street. While most of the traffic goes from advancements in technology and 
productivity to growth, there is also some flow in the other direction from growth providing the 
environment and resources for innovation. In the case of Japan, we have already seen that the 
national innovation system and more measurable innovation inputs were essentially unchanged 
over the period of Japan’s rapid postwar growth from the 1960s through the mid-1980s, the 
bubble economy period of 1985-90, and even after the persistent economic slowdown of the 
1990s. If we believe that variations in national economic performance are tightly tied to changes 
in technological innovation, over time-spans as short as business cycles, this is a disturbing result. 
Of course, inputs are just that, inputs, and what generates changes in productivity are innovation 
outputs -like actual patents, high-value-added exports, and technological leadership in advanced 
industries. Perhaps a close association between innovation and performance in the Japanese 
postwar experience, including the reversal of economic performance in the last decade, can be 
found in the quality and quantity of Japanese innovation. 
            There is a plausible case to be made that although the Japanese national innovation system 
was largely unchanged in its structures, practices, and inputs from the 1950s through the 1990s, 
the world and technology changed around it, making the same system less effective at producing 
innovation in the 1990s. The assessment of the declining relevance of technical higher education 
in Japan given in the previous section bears some resemblance to this view. This interpretation   28 
that the technological world is moving past Japan could be the case even if the assessment of the 
previous section is correct, that the Japanese system permitted far more competition, with far less 
research coordination and picking winners, than often thought. Such a mismatch hypothesis could 
be true even if all of the major changes that occurred in the Japanese innovation system would 
have to be classified as improvements in encouraging innovation. The mismatch between 
Japanese economic organization and the global technology shift (to the creativity some suggest is 
required for software and biotech, for example) would simply have to outweigh these positive 
factors. Such an explanation would of course allow the decline in Japanese national economic 
performance in the 1990s to be attributed, at least in part, to technical change after all.  
This position was partly advanced by Lincoln (1988) for Japanese industrial and 
commercial practices more broadly, not specifically innovation, in his argument that a mature–
meaning wealthy and technologically “caught-up”– Japan, having exhausted foreign technology, 
would have to adapt its structures to remain within acceptable political bounds on trade 
competition and still grow. In terms of economic analysis of growth rates, however, this argument 
would seem to imply that Japan should have slowed down more than the average estimated effect 
of convergence, which occurs to all countries as they approach the technological frontier and the 
accumulation of advanced levels of human and physical capital, and this was not the case
44. The 
declines in TFP growth of Japan throughout the postwar period seen in tables 7 and 8 are in line 
with what growth economics would predict, or if anything lower than one would expect based on 
convergence
45. This would also seem to imply that the Japanese rate of innovation should have 
abruptly declined upon losing easy targets for reverse or improvement engineering, which we will 
examine. 
The idea that the unchanged Japanese innovation system no longer works given current 
changes in the pace or nature of technology has also been asserted more pointedly in recent years 
with regards to technical development specifically, though in much looser form than Lincoln 
(1988). See, for examples among responsible observers inside and outside Japan, OECD (1998), 
“More generally, weak business performance has led some to question the appropriateness of the 
                                                                 
44 Specifically, this would mean that using the sort of cross-country panel estimated by Barro discussed in 
the first section to make a prediction about growth rates, controlling for other fundamentals as well as 
convergence (proxied by initial per capita income), Japanese growth would come in below predicted levels 
starting sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s.  Japan, however, remained a positive outlier in such 
growth regressions until the 1990s. 
45 One could also point out that the Japanese growth rate actually sped up for several years in the mid-
1980s, Japanese income levels approached American levels, and when growth slowed, it was as Japanese 
income levels have declined in relative terms throughout the last decade.  Even such multi-year swings are 
probably best seen as too short-term to be determined by convergence issues, which is precisely the point 
against the simple catch-up hypotheses.   29 
Japanese corporate system in an environment which requires rapid decision-making and 
calculated risk-taking to achieve higher rates of return;” MITI’s White Papers on International 
Trade of 1998-2000 calling for structural reform to converge on the US model because of the gap 
with the United States in ICT, software, and biotechnology; and the NITSDC (1999), “The targets 
of technological innovation were clear enough in the catch-up years when Japan was achieving 
rapid economic growth due to increased demand. [As opposed to the present,] such targets as 
building a product image concept or fulfilling requirements specified were easy to identify.” The 
popular business press is of course filled with strong claims that Japan is not entrepreneurial nor 
flexible nor creative enough to take advantage of new industries like those in information 
technology fuelling the US boom, because they require start-ups and lack of conformity. Again, if 
these assertions were true, the measurable innovative inputs marshalled by the unchanged 
Japanese innovation system should be of declining value, and the measurable outputs in terms of 
technologies and competitiveness should decline as a result.  
Luckily data are readily available on whether innovation outputs of technologies and 
competitive industries are declining in Japan during the period of Japanese economic decline. 
Turning first to measures of the academic research produced in the sciences, Japan of course does 
continue to lag the United States in the capture of Nobel Prizes (see table 11), and does not 
produce the amount of academic papers or citations proportional to its share of world population 
or wealth. As seen in the first panel of table 16, Japan and Germany have essentially equivalent 
shares of articles and citations listed in the Science Citation Index (SCI) database for a 
representative sample year (1994), despite the German economy and population being two-thirds 
the size of Japan’s, and the United States has severalfold more articles and citations
46. This is a 
statement about comparative levels, however, not about whether Japan’s share has suffered a 
sustained decline in recent years, and there is no evidence of that.  
The second panel of table 16 presents OECD (1998) data taken from the SCI in 1986 and 1996. 
The gap between the US and Japanese number of papers published, and the number of total 
citations to published articles, actually closes over the decade, and in absolute terms both the 
number of refereed published technical papers by Japanese authors, and the number of citations to 
Japanese authors rises (by 22 percent and 18 percent respectively). It must be noted that Japan’s 
“Quality Ratio” (defined as number of citations per paper) declines slightly (by 8 percent) over 
the decade, while the American quality ratio is essentially unchanged. So despite the concerns 
                                                                 
46 The SCI article and publication numbers, while the best available measure, inherently understate the 
actual contributions of Japanese researchers because many publish some or all of their work in Japanese, 
which of course limits their outlets and readership (as might publishing in English as a second language, for 
a given quality of research).  There is unfortunately no way of estimating the size of this effect.   30 
about the basic research capabilities of Japan as the global cutting edge technologies shifted in the 
1990s, there is no evidence of a sharp decline, and even some of an improvement. 
Turning to actual patents applied for and received, the evidence is also that Japanese 
innovation has kept up with the times. As noted previously, the 1994 Uruguay Round of the 
GATT led to some standardization of patent protection and procedures across countries, as well 
as some specific changes in the Japanese framework. This makes longitudinal comparison of data 
from before and after 1993 somewhat problematic, but makes easier the comparison of 
developments across countries since that time
47. What can be seen is that Japan has in recent 
years had the lion’s share of patent and utility model applications worldwide. In 1997, for 
example, Japan filed 9.4 percent of the world’s patent applications, versus 5.2 percent for the 
United States and 4.3 percent for Germany
48. Of patent rights owned worldwide in 1997, the 
United States held 1,113,000, Japan held 871,000, and Germany held 337,000. Unlike with 
respect to academic papers, Japan carries a share of patents much larger than its proportionate 
share (as compared to the United States or to the world total) based on population and wealth. 
The US National Research Council/Japan Society for the Promotion of Science joint task force 
(1999) observed that basic research conducted by Japanese corporations has been undiminished 
through the 1990s, while corporate basic research has actually declined in the United States. This 
is another indication, in line with the discussion under inputs, that Japan’s system does maintain 
long-term investment, and that even if that has predictably positive effects on innovation, those 
do not necessarily outweigh the effect of other factors on growth (including some potentially 
harmful ones directly from low returns on capital). 
In line with Japan’s on-going production of patentable technologies, the country’s 
balance of technology trade has improved over time. Up until the mid-1970s, Japanese firms were 
heavily dependent upon technological imports from the United States and Europe. As Japanese 
private sector R&D activities increased in the late 1970s and the 1980s, technological exports 
increased, first to the developed economies, and in the 1990s increasingly to affiliates or 
operations of Japanese multinationals in emerging Asia. As MITI (1998) notes, the value of 
Japanese technological imports from Western countries remained flat in the 1990s–Japan’s 
overall technology trade deficit has ranged between 1 and 4 percent of GDP since 1980, with no 
pattern of expansion in the last 10 years. This would appear to be inconsistent with a world in 
                                                                 
47 Additionally, in 1987 Japan changed its “model application” for patent protection, revising the multiple 
claim system, which previously obtained, resulting in a steady increase in the number of patents applied for 
within Japan since 1988.  This, too, makes analysis of the long-term pattern of Japanese patent data 
problematic.    31 
which new technologies emerged outside Japan that were of particularly high value added, such 
that Japanese firms would be incapable of producing the goods (at least in part) themselves, or of 
finding other technologically advanced goods to trade for them. It is an undeniable reality that 
Japan has shortfalls in the production of ICT, software, and related services, especially as 
compared to the United States
49, but these are not the only high-tech goods in the world. Even if 
investment in these technologies may have special spillover benefits for growth, that is a matter 
of the economy as a whole adopting them, and not of producing those products themselves. In 
other words, the willingness of the Japanese economy to do necessary capital deepening as new 
transformative technologies arise is likely to be independent of whether Japan has the technical 
capacity to produce high-tech goods–a point I return to in the next section. 
In fact, according to the US Patent and Trademark Office, the five fields generating the 
most patents annually since 1995 are active solid-state technologies, optics, computerized control 
systems, semiconductor manufacturing processes, and pharmaceuticals. Japanese companies are 
among the world leaders in the first four of these, and are nearly in control of the markets for 
optical and active solid-state technologies
50. In the last five years, patents granted to Japanese 
inventors and corporations have averaged 19 percent of the total annual patents granted by the 
USPTO, twice the proportion of 20 years ago
51. As shown in table 17, six of the top ten patenting 
companies with the USPTO in 1999 were Japanese, and every one of those six had been in the 
top 10 either four or all five out of the five years 1995-99.  The Business Week “Info Tech 200” 
list for 2000 puts 148 of the world’s top ICT companies in the United States, while Japan has 
only 17 that make the list–but that 17 is good enough for second place in the national statistics, 
with Canada (five firms), Taiwan (five), and Sweden (three) rounding out the top five locations. 
Again, this is difficult to reconcile with a belief that recent technological advances have left Japan 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
48 Policy Planning and Research Office (2000), from WIPO and MITI data. Annual patent and utility 
applications from Japan consistently stay within the range of 39,000-46,000 per year. 
49 “Japan continues to import technologies from Europe and the United States in the fields of 
telecommunications and electronics, and, while relying less than before on foreign sources for hardware, 
depends increasingly on foreign software…Looking at service industries, Japan ranks first in service trade 
deficit among major countries, and is weak in international competitiveness owing to low service export 
intensity.”  [MITI (1998), p. 14] 
50 In Fransman’s (1999) assessment of the ICT industries, “four out of the world’s top ten computer 
companies are Japanese (Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba); two out of the top ten telecommunications 
equipment firms are Japanese (NEC and Fujitsu); and six out of the top ten semiconductor companies are 
Japanese (NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, and Matsushita)…[these firms] dominated 
global markets in areas such as memory semiconductors, optoelectronic semiconductors, microcontrollers 
and LCD’s…[they have been] significantly less successful outside Japan in crucial markets such as 
mainframe computers, workstations, servers, personal computers, microprocessors, packaged software, and 
complex telecommunications equipment.” 
51 U.S.P.T.O. data cited in “The Alchemy of Innovation,” Conrad de Aendle, International Herald Tribune, 
September 23, 2000, p. 13.   32 
behind, or that a mature Japanese economy is incapable of advancing the technical frontier. That 
these years coincided with the worst macroeconomic performance by the Japanese economy since 
1950 is an especially striking indication of the apparent independence of Japanese innovative 
outputs from economic performance writ large
52. 
 
THE DISJUNCTURE BETWEEN HIGH-TECH INNOVATION AND BROADER 
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN JAPAN 
 
Obviously, the fact that Japan has steady investment in R&D, ongoing success in generating 
innovation, and competitive high-tech industries has been insufficient to maintain a high level of 
national economic performance. This could be due to the fact that in the medium-term of even a 
decade such factors as macroeconomic policy and financial market efficiency, as well as external 
shocks, predominate in swings of growth
53. Yet, the importance of technology to economic 
performance should not be entirely discarded, even for the swing in Japanese growth of the last 
two decades–it is arguable that the major contribution of innovation to national economic 
performance is in how it is used and implemented across a national economy, rather than in 
capturing the benefits of producing innovative products. 
It is well-known that the bulk of the Japanese economy, in fact practically the entire 
economy outside of the export-oriented manufacturing sectors, is beset by very low productivity, 
extreme inflexibility, and long-term stagnation (except where government patronage directly 
increases demand). There has been a complete lack of diffusion of either technical progress or 
labor productivity from the high-tech sector to the rest of the Japanese economy in the last 40 
years. This bears some resemblance to the assessment made by Gordon (2001) that, in the United 
States in the 1990s, the bulk of the productivity gains were made in the computer equipment 
industry, and were not seen (as yet) in the rest of the manufacturing sector, let alone the rest of 
the American economy. It would appear that technical progress can be very localized in its 
                                                                 
52 In a provocative empirical paper, Edward Wolff (1999) groups industries by their R&D intensity of 
production, and by their growth rates, and analyzes whether Japan specialized in the wrong industries as 
compared to Germany and the United States.  He concludes “…that generally speaking [in 1970-1989] 
Japan’s industrial structure moved towards industries experiencing higher growth rates…In the 1989-94 
period, by contrast, the overall output growth rate is insensitive to the choice of output weights.  This result 
indicates that the slowdown in aggregate growth over this period is due to the decline of output growth 
across the full range of industries in Japan, rather than to a shift in output towards slower growth 
industries.” [p.12] 
53 Posen (1998), chapter 6, makes an argument to this effect as a warning against premature judging of 
“national economic models” as determinative of swings in economic growth, let alone as cohesive wholes.   33 
benefits, if the nature of the technology is simply to make production of one product (here, 
computers) cheaper.  
CEA (2001), however, argues that much of the American “New Economy” was due to 
the benefits of adoption of IT in sectors outside of IT production because it is a “transformative” 
technology–just-in-time inventory through computerization, greater tailoring of financial and 
other business services, more decentralized production schemes for workers, and so on, emerge 
out of IT usage. That report offers the first rigorous empirical evidence that productivity gains in 
the American economy in the 1990s can plausibly be linked to the diffusion of IT across firms.  
And there is little question that the spread of IT in the Japanese quick private sector is for 
less than in the United States, (see table 19). The argument is far from settled, however, and not 
only because we must wait to see what productivity gains survive the American downturn, which 
began in the last quarter of 2000. Cohen, Dickens, and Posen (2001) note that many changes in 
US corporate practices, particularly in dealing with their workforces, defining the boundaries of 
the firm, and increasing flexibility of production–the same practices which CEA (2001) point to 
as critical to US improvements in productivity–began to be adopted in the mid-1980s, timed to 
observable changes in labor demand, well-before IT investment was large or widespread. They 
also note that widespread technological change is usually accompanied by a rise in 
unemployment and a dispersion of returns to labor across sectors during the period of adoption, 
but the opposite on both accounts occurred in the United States in the 1990s. 
What is relevant for understanding the Japanese experience from this American 
discussion of technology and the new economy is that, to whatever one ascribes the US 
productivity gains, the Japanese economy already had it, at least in part: the efficiencies of 
production of IT components are in industries where Japanese firms and licensed technologies 
play a key role; the share, level, and growth of business investment growth in IT is higher in 
Japan than in any other advanced nation except the United States, (see table 20)
54; the high 
performance work organizations, including total quality management (TQM) and team 
production, as well as just-in-time inventory practices were prevalent in Japanese manufacturing 
by the 1980s, and were a model for US adoption. So it is striking that the overwhelming majority 
of Japanese economic activity has not benefited from these attributes the way that the American 
economy has. A persistently dual economy to the degree it exists in Japan is really rather odd.  
 
 
                                                                 
54 See Fujitsu Research Institute (1997), OECD (2000),  and Tanaka (2000) for data on total  IT investment.    34 
 
Even putting aside supposedly transformative technologies like ICT and the Internet, the 
idea that there could be so little spillover benefit or seepage of knowledge about productive 
practices from the advanced sectors in whatever technology to the rest of the Japanese economy 
for so long goes against some of our common ideas about technical progress. We usually assume 
that information or knowledge is nonrival and difficult to completely appropriate, that is, that the 
original innovator’s using it does not constrain my also benefiting from it, and that it is difficult 
for that innovator to keep the knowledge completely to herself. Put bluntly, patent protection is 
rarely impervious to efforts at copying, stealing, or reverse engineering of a product, technique, or 
process. This is especially true for the broader or more organizational innovations--for example, 
the concept of just-in-time inventory, and the methods for implementing it, or the idea of the 
video cassette recorder--which tend to be quickly emulated by the innovator’s competitors. 
The usual qualification to this assumption is that what we refer to as development, or the 
detailed implementation and utilization of the knowledge in a specific product, is where the 
profits really come from. It is true that workers can move from place to place, and learning by 
doing in one product line or with one client or supplier can spill over to others. It is also true that 
such things as brand names, client relationships, specialized design, management, and especially 
shop floor skills, permit a firm, whether the innovator or a follower to maintain some property 
rights. So Toyota can watch manufacturing firms around the world adopt just-in-time inventory 
and quality circles, but its workers (and the training of them) allow Toyota to garner the benefits 
of more successfully implementing the same innovations; Sony and Phillips can both create the 
VCR, find that every other consumer electronics company has their own competing model within 
months, and be forced to make their profits from their brand names and additional features or 
quality, not from coming up with the innovation itself. 
For purposes of this discussion, the key implication is that technological innovations 
should diffuse, both across borders within the same industry, and across industries within the 
same country, given sufficient human and financial capital to take advantage of the innovation. 
This diffusion is part of what lies behind the story of conditional macroeconomic convergence in 
the Solow growth model, seen in the cross-national evidence. A belief in the power of this 
diffusion is what underlies the many stories of postwar Japan growing through reverse 
engineering and conscious “catch-up” with Western products. For an industrial sector to remain 
technologically backward within a country that has good universal education, free flow of 
information, and some minimum mobility of workers and capital, usually some government   35 
policy (like public ownership, protection of interest groups from competition, or discrimination) 
is at work to reduce the incentives to improve productivity
55.  
The Japanese dual economy of 40 years and counting–clearly the result of excessive 
government protection of particular interest groups–illustrates just how powerful such 
government and social disincentives can be even when more productive practices are literally 
around the corner. McKinsey Global Institute (2000) goes into painful detail documenting the 
tightly controlled distribution network for goods, the prevalence of mom-and-pop retail stores, the 
legal environment preventing the adoption of economies of scale in either distribution or retail 
stores, the lack of transparency in pricing for consumers, and the political connections of the 
small store owners to the Liberal Democratic Party. These forces combine to increase the costs 
and decrease the efficiency of all purchasing in Japan–and, of course, this has implications for the 
economy as a whole given that consumption is 65 to 70 percent of Japanese GDP
56. Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001) document how the “Convoy system” for Japanese banks and securities firms on 
the part of Japanese regulators–a much greater moral-hazard inducing version of “too big to fail”–
interacted with connected lending relationships and barriers to competition to induce inefficient 
financial practices. Even manufacturing for domestic use or in lower-technology products in 
Japan suffers from overcapacity and fragmented production due to lack of competition and a 
network that supports small companies. 
The fact that these disincentives have co-existed with the Japanese national innovation 
system’s success in producing technical progress, the Japanese world-beating export companies 
in high-tech sectors, and the years of both feast and famine in Japanese national economic 
performance, demonstrates that technological innovation on its own terms is a far less powerful 
force in determining the fate of national economies than one might have thought. The regulatory 
structure of the economy (not specific to technology), along with macroeconomic and financial 
policy (as argued in the first section), may have much more to do with economic growth over any 
meaningful time-horizon for public policy than innovation does
57. Of course, this assumes that the 
                                                                 
55 The existence of geographic pockets of backwardness in wealthy societies is another matter. 
56 At the margin there have been some changes in this backwards retail system in recent years, through 
changes in the retail stores law, the existence of Internet shopping, and the creation of some discounters, 
but these small changes so far have not had much of a discernable impact on the Japanese economy. 
57 I choose not to give in to the temptation to classify these sorts of interest group protecting regulations as 
an aspect of how the government treats innovation, or as part of a country’s capacity to innovate.  For one 
thing, so doing would extend the definition of innovation to be anything to do with productivity increases 
of any kind, and would erode any significance to the technological aspect.  For another, these regulations 
are not directed against innovation, and their removal would directly enhance growth even if technical 
innovation halted.  Finally, it is almost tautological to point out that protectionism, be it domestic or 
foreign, inhibits the flow of new technologies.   36 
economy in question is at a sufficient level of development, wealth, popular education, and rule 
of law so as to allow innovation to occur where the specific protections do not apply. 
In Japan, unfortunately, the specific protections apply to almost the entire non-traded 
(i.e., without import competition) portion of the economy: services, retail, utilities, transportation, 
real estate, local construction, and so on. Table 18 gives the comparative costs to business in 
Japan and four other economies, including the United States, for various services or inputs to 
production. In every activity, with the exception of coastal shipping, American business costs are 
lower: 23-33 percent lower for energy, 39 percent lower for railway shipping, 45 percent lower 
for air freight shipping, 52 percent lower for long distance telecommunications, 89 percent lower 
for the development of commercial real estate. Germany, Singapore, and even South Korea also 
have meaningfully lower business costs than Japan in just about all of these categories. The high 
costs in each category represent either a regulation (limiting land uses), or a public monopoly 
(until recently on petroleum), or a government price support program of some sort (NTT on long 
distance services) protecting an interest group, and therefore removing the incentive to increase 
productivity. 
Consistent with this view, Agarwal, et al. (1996) found that the productivity of capital in 
Japan is only two-thirds of that in the United States, but the income share of capital was the same. 
This inefficiency can be attributed to Japanese corporate management underutilizing available 
resources, accepting local sourcing of equipment rather than searching globally, and demanding a 
relatively low financial return on capital. For services in Japan, the picture is just as bleak. 
According to estimates from the Economic Planning Agency of Japan, the average price of 
services has quadrupled since 1970, while the retail value of manufacturing has only gone up by 
70 percent. This is related directly to the productivity differential between the two sectors.  
Meanwhile, the successful high-tech or high-value-added export companies in Japan, like 
electronics and automobiles, have shifted production overseas and cut domestic factories and 
employment, in an ongoing effort to stay competitive with additional productivity gains. (Japan 
Development Bank [1996]). The irony of firms like Sony and Toshiba announcing cost-cutting 
and restructuring programs in 1998, while the construction industry in Japan continued to add 
thousands of workers through the largesse of the LDP majority in the Japanese Diet, cannot be 
overstated. Yet, the differential in productivity just keeps growing.  
McKinsey Global Institute (2000) found that Japanese exporters in such industries as 
autos, steel, machine tools, and consumer electronics are still “bettering any and all [international] 
competitors’ productivity by 20 percent,” but those sectors only employ 10 percent of the 
Japanese workforce (no more than the legendarily unproductive construction sector alone, I   37 
would note). On McKinsey’s (2000) estimates, the remaining 90 percent of the Japanese 
economy is only half as productive, with such sectors as retail, food processing, home 
construction, and health care running at around 60 percent of US productivity levels in the same 
sectors. Even under the pressure of Japan’s harshest recession, when real estate, wholesale and 
retail trade, agriculture and fisheries, finance and insurance, and construction are clearly 
underperforming both the already weak Japanese stock market and their industries worldwide 
(Matsuoka and Calderwood [1999])–and when the more productive Japanese firms continue to be 
recognized in financial markets, and to lead by example--there is no diffusion of more productive 
practices to be seen. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
ACCEPTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION  
AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE JAPANESE CASE  
(AND BEYOND?)  
Technological innovation is the ultimate source of any sustained economic growth. One can 
differentiate between truly revolutionary innovations, such as the steam engine or air- 
conditioning or the transistor, and incremental improvements in production processes or products 
such as Toyota’s Type G loom or the VCR or better semiconductor chip inscription
58. The 
revolutionary technologies improve our well-being as well as our wealth, and can even alter 
political systems and the international balance of power–but all technological innovations, even 
the most minor, contribute to economic growth by enhancing our productivity. As a result of such 
visible power, there is a temptation to ascribe much of the variation in national economic 
performance across countries, over time, to differences in national innovation systems. Getting 
beyond the obvious statements, however, that investment in innovation is good, and that having a 
society that respects property rights and education helps innovation, to issues of real relevance for 
economic policy in the industrialized democracies takes a bit more doing
59.  
Judged on its direct results, the Japanese national innovation system must be deemed a 
success. Over the last half-century, Japan went from being a defeated country with a devastated 
economy to the world’s largest net creditor nation with technological leadership in many 
advanced industries, as well as in many manufacturing processes. From the late-1970s to the mid-
                                                                 
58 Mokyr (2000) and Gordon (2001) to some degree debate whether the recent developments in IT and the 
Internet constitute such a transformative technology or not. 
59 Successful implementation of such policies as universal education and protection of property rights are 
very real issues in developing countries, but for the industrial democracies including Japan constitute no 
more than appeals to motherhood and apple pie.   38 
1990s, the Japanese economic model–including its emphasis on R&D and the utilization of 
technology–was hypothesized, described, and then idealized as an exemplar for emulation.  
It turns out that with the benefit of a few more years of hindsight and of academic 
analysis, the elements of Japanese economic success were not all that mysterious (universal high 
education, high savings and investment during catch-up, low inflation, commitment to R&D, 
export orientation in key manufacturing sectors). It also turns out that many of the distinctive 
aspects of the Japanese model were as much hindrances as help (relationship banking instead of 
transparent securitized finance, protection of domestic sectors from competition, bureaucratic 
stewardship of a vast share of household savings). The politics of how this system emerged and 
held together are not trivial, as can be seen by the difficulties of other emerging markets 
achieving Japanese income levels despite explicit efforts to emulate the “model”–nevertheless, 
for our understanding of the role of technological innovation in national economic performance, 
the messages are clear. 
One important conclusion is that the successful Japanese innovation system was less odd 
and interventionist than it was often perceived to be by American eyes, and therefore also less 
puzzling in its reasons for success. A consistently high level of R&D investment, funded and 
allocated for the most part by the private sector, adequate property rights, and excellent utilization 
of teamwork and specialized worker training in production were the basis. These factors 
combined with domestic competition in high-tech and key manufacturing industries and an 
insufficiently recognized degree of individual entrepreneurship, lead to ongoing innovation. But 
as the mystery of Japan’s ongoing success in innovation strictly defined recedes, other notable 
aspects of the relationship between Japanese innovation and growth come to the fore. 
The swings in Japanese economic growth in the postwar period would be truly puzzling if 
the relationship between technological innovation and national economic performance were 
particularly tight. Japan’s economic growth rate slowed from seemingly miraculous in the 1950s 
and 1960s, to simply tops among advanced economies in the 1970s and 1980s, to outright 
stagnation in the 1990s. Through this entire period of wide variation in economic growth, the 
Japanese national innovation system remained essentially unchanged, with both the institutional 
framework (including such matters as the role of the private and public sectors in the allocation of 
R&D funding) and the inputs (such as patent rights and access to credit for innovators) stable or 
turning slightly more favorable toward innovation in the 1990s
60. Throughout this entire period of 
wide variation in economic growth, the output of the Japanese innovation system–in terms of 
                                                                 
60 The one notable exception being Japanese graduate science and engineering education, where there may 
have been a change for the worse in recent years, as discussed in the second section above.   39 
scientific research, patents, net trade in technology, and competitiveness in high-tech sectors–
remained consistently impressive, and (like the inputs) either unchanged or slightly improved 
during the downturn of the 1990s. The measurable onward march of Japanese innovation gives 
the lie to all but the most circular attempts to argue that the reason for Japan’s poor economic 
performance in the 1990s was a shortfall in technical progress. In advanced economies, there are 
factors in national performance much more significant than technological innovation. 
Clearly, there were and are many severe structural problems affecting most parts of the 
Japanese economy outside the most innovative sectors. These problems, mostly due to direct or 
indirect Japanese government protection of various domestic interest groups from domestic 
competition, have manifested themselves in the creation of a truly dual economy. There has been 
little or no diffusion of technological progress or productivity enhancing practices from the 10 
percent of the Japanese economy that is export competitive to the 90 percent of the Japanese 
economy that is not–even while corporations and countries around the world have imported or 
implemented Japanese advances (think of the transformation of American auto industry work and 
supply practices). Although there are large parts of the United States and other advanced 
economies that display similar backwardness relative to the high-tech sectors, Japan stands alone 
in the degree and depth of this disjunction. 
While the protections that give rise to this division are not themselves directed against 
technological diffusion per se, and do not appear to directly interfere with technological 
innovation in Japan, they nonetheless do limit Japan’s potential growth rate. It would stretch the 
meaning of “technological innovation” beyond useful recognition, however, to state that these 
inefficiencies should be considered failures of Japanese innovation policy just because they 
constrain productivity growth. Furthermore, the drag on the Japanese economy from these 
inefficiencies and impediments to markets have a much greater direct effect on Japanese 
economic performance than they do through obstructing the adoption of IT or other innovations. 
A true and complete liberalization of the Japanese financial, retail, and telecommunications 
sectors would result in an increase in growth of 3 percent or more a year, according to OECD 
(1998), a number at least double the 1.0-1.5 percent increase in American productivity in the 
1990s (which may not be entirely attributable to IT investment in any event). So it is to some 
degree misleading to cast the need for performance-enhancing change in Japan as a matter of 
increasing the receptivity of the economy to adoption of innovation–though, certainly, that would 
be an additional and worthwhile element of reform. 
Of course, there still remains a great deal of room for Japan, as for any country, to 
improve its capacity for innovation and the diffusion of technical change through targeted reform   40 
efforts. As mentioned previously, the state of Japanese university research and education in the 
sciences is poor, and, like in most countries outside the United States, the institutions for venture 
capital and a culture of corporate start-ups are undeveloped. Even for an advanced economy, 
which does maintain its position at the technological frontier in international competition, more 
encouragement of innovation is better. Various groups within the Japanese government and 
business leadership have grown concerned with their country’s lagging behind the United States 
in such growth industries as information technology and biotechnology, while the emerging 
markets close the gap in manufacturing efficiency (reflected in Japanese manufacturers’ 
“hollowing out” of domestic production).  
The Japanese government’s report on “National Industrial Technology Strategies in 
Japan,” (NITSDC 1999), for example, lists eight sources of concern: few homegrown 
technologies; lagging behind in intellectual property rights and standards; few start-ups; 
increasing difficulty of handing down work techniques in traditional Japanese fashion; 
differences between the skills of university graduates and those demanded by industry; 
differences between the research emphases of universities and scientific institutions, and those of 
industry; “foreign institutional ties” in research; and few “Nobel-prize level results.” These 
concerns clearly are more oriented toward increasing innovation inputs and outputs as strictly 
defined in this paper, and not with easing the adoption of technology in the rest of Japanese 
society. This reflects an explicit sense of relative decline on the part of Japanese officials in the 
ability of Japan to “compete” in the leading industries. On my analysis, however, this may be a 
misguided priority, not only because Japan actually is doing well on innovation outputs, and not 
only because bigger gains to economic performance may be found in broader economic reforms, 
but also because the technologies that will be “leading” or “critical” in years ahead may not 
necessarily be ones which seem important today or where Japan is not already on the path to 
competitiveness
61. Of course, such efforts at improving the Japanese innovation system can only 
help the Japanese economy – so long as they do not come at the expense of other reforms, and are 
of benefit to general innovative capacity (rather than targeted toward achieving goals in specific 
technologies). 
                                                                 
61 One need only remember how the US economic bureaucracy saw the American economy as perhaps 
irretrievably behind the Japanese economy in the “critical” technologies of HDTV and semiconductors in 
the early 1990s, and took that as a verdict on its national innovation system, only later to find that HDTV 
was a dead-end and semiconductors had become a commodity product.  Meanwhile, Japan has potentially 
leading technologies in optics and in wireless communications which are emerging today, though those are 
not acknowledged as criteria for judging the effectiveness of the Japanese innovation system, given the 
present fashions for biotech and IT.   41 
The Government of Japan also has taken the view that lagging in IT and biotechnology 
marks a relative decline in Japan’s innovative capacity. A new “Science and Technology Basic 
Law” passed in 1995 was intended to encourage collaboration between industry, academia, and 
government funded research institutions, to begin reforming universities, to increase the creativity 
of students, and to increase the flexibility of government relationships with industry. As always in 
Japanese economic policy, however, a whole series of successor laws and programs with the 
same stated intention were announced before the first publicized effort was ever implemented, 
even in part. The most prominent in the area of innovation system reform since 1995 have been
62:  
 
•  the “Science and Technology Basic Plan” of July 1996, supposed to increase the mobility of 
researchers by investing in postdoctoral scientific training, by enhancing the transfer of patent 
rights in collaborative university research, and by improving the fairness of evaluation of 
applications for government research grants;  
•  a promised increase in government R&D investment of 17 trillion yen ($155 billion) over 
1997-2002, none of which has been funded as of this writing;  
•  an “Educational Reform Programme” of August 1997 specifically proposed to reform the 
universities at both the undergraduate and graduate levels;  
•  an April 1998 law, actually passed, to emulate the US Bayh-Dole Amendment, reducing the 
licensing fees for university researchers working on patentable technologies supported 
government grants;  
•  an “Action Plan for Economic Structural Reform” from MITI in October 1998, which 
stressed the goal of creating new industries through measures like enhanced roles for venture 
capital and OTC stock listings, freer labor mobility and use of outsourcing, increasing IPR 
protection and joint research, and investments in ICT infrastructure
63; 
•  and most recently, on 1 December 2000, the Japanese government announced an “Action 
Plan for New Economic Growth,” which “contains a wide range of policy measures to 
                                                                 
62 The Japanese government has announced, and in a few important (but certainly not most) cases 
implemented, a much broader structural reform agenda for the economy beyond the area of technological 
innovation.  See Tanaka (2000) and Nishiyama (2000) for brief advocatory summaries of this agenda. 
63 “The government will concentrate its efforts on the development of a business environment for fifteen 
industries expected to grow in the future…At the same time, it will cope with various problems related to 
‘funds’, ‘human resources’, ‘technology’, and ‘information and telecommunications’, all of which are 
indispensable for fostering new industries.” [Industrial Policy Bureau (1998), p. 8]  The specification of 
target industries sounds like the old image of picking winners, but given that it is fifteen, and they include 
such broad areas as “Info and telecomms,” “Distribution and logistics,” “Environment,” “Hum an 
resources,” and “Aviation and space (civil)”, the government’s priorities seem not all that confining.   42 
promote continuing economic reform and deregulation in Japan,” including “measures to 
upgrade the foundation for creative research and development.” 
 
As could be expected as the result of a government initiative, these last two “Action Plans” serve 
many objectives at once. Both combine targeted initiatives “to maximize the utilization of IT and 
to induce demand and capital investment, especially in IT-related fields…” while also 
recognizing the more general need to reassess “…the extent to which existing systems have 
served to redistribute resources from high- to low-productivity sectors…”
64  
Leaving aside the questions of the Japanese government’s willingness to implement such 
plans, it should be noted that the stated impetus for these Japanese government proposals is much 
the same as concerns expressed in continental Europe, particularly in Germany, in recent years, 
where no abrupt fall from economic grace comparable to that of Japan in the last decade has 
occurred. Just as the United States was stimulated to improvement by the relatively better 
performance of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, it may be inevitable for democratic countries to 
compare their innovation capabilities to those of the contemporary leader in productivity. Thus, if 
this concern constitutes a recognition that an economy should always try to improve its potential 
growth rate through improvement of its innovation system, no matter how successful that system 
has been, this would be as healthy development in Japan as it would be elsewhere. 
If, on the other hand, an attempt to precisely replicate the current American innovation 
system is based on a mistaken assessment that Japan’s failure to be a leader in biotech and IT 
indicates that the Japanese national innovation system is the source of Japanese economic decline, 
it may be unhealthy. Such an effort could divert economic policy attention from the truly pressing 
needs of addressing debt-deflation and financial fragility in Japan, and of liberalizing the 90 
percent of the Japanese economy mired in low productivity. Whether intentionally or not, that 
would shift the blame for Japanese economic stagnation in the 1990s from the factors that truly 
deserve it. And the Japanese public would in that case eventually be disappointed by its 
government putting too great a reliance on a close relationship between technological innovation 
and national economic performance–one that its own country’s postwar experience indicates 
holds loosely at best when other factors such as macroeconomic policy and financial shocks are 
taken into account.  
                                                                 
64 Quotations taken from the overall government Action Plan of 2000 (a complete English language outline 
of this report can be found at http://www.miti.go.jp/english/index.html); the MITI Action Plan of 1998, 
which was a precursor to this plan, has similar language and multiple objectives.  Interestingly, to stave off 
the type of cynicism engendered by this list of previous “action plans,” the English summary notes that 
“Almost half of the 260 measures [contained in the Plan] will be carried into effect in one year.”   43 
Even if the true advantages for national economic performance from technical innovation 
come from how widely and well a country uses technology, rather than simply how much 
innovation it produces, that would lead Japan to a much broader structural reform agenda to 
enhance competition and reallocation of productive factors, rather than one which focuses on the 
national innovation system strictly speaking. And, if such wide-ranging liberal reforms were ever 
enacted in Japan, the benefits to growth would largely be felt directly in the efficiency gains in 
the sectors in question--though the additional gains from the increased flexibility in adopting new 
technology would certainly be seen throughout the economy as well.  44 
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Note: 2000 GDP Growth is OECD Forecast, Nov. 2000)Table 2
Long-term Performance of the Japanese Economy
Average annual real growth rate (%)
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-97
GDP 10.2 4.5 4 1.7
Private Consumption 9 4.7 3.7 2
Public Consumption 4.8 4.8 2.5 1.9
Resid. Investment 16.8 3.2 3.9 -1.8
Bus. Fixed Invest. 16.6 2.8 8.1 0.6
Public Investment 14.4 5.9 0.8 4.9
Exports 16.1 9.7 5.4 5.1
Imports 14.7 5.9 6.3 4.3
Employee Comp. 11.1 5.8 3.7 2.1
Disposable Income 9.5 4.8 3 2.2
Source: OECD Economic Survey 1997-1998Table 3
Monetary and Financial Developments in the 1990s
(Annual percentage change)
GDP CPI WPI Real yen/$   Land Stock
Deflator   Price Price
1991 2.89 2.3 -1.29 72.2 0.55 2.38
1992 0.94 2.08 -1.69 67.4 -5.11 -32.03
1993 0.44 0.91 -4.07 62.4 -5.13 16.91
1994 -0.62 0.5 1.25 58.5 -3.82 0.47
1995 -0.38 0.07 -0.06 61.5 -4.3 -4.9
1996 -2.23 0.3 -0.33 71.2 -4.43 5.47
1997 1 2.23 1.42 79.4 -3.62 -20.85
1998 0.17 -0.32 -3.64 76.8 -4.38 -15.37
1999 -0.79 0 -4.12 76.9 -5.67 23
Source: Bernanke (2000), Tables 7.1 and 7.2
Notes: Real yen/$ rate is computed with January 1979=100
Land price is from index of commercial buildings in urban areas
Stock price is percentage change in Topix indexTable 4
Government Deficits and Debt






















General Government Gross Debt (National Accounts basis)
(% of GDP)
Japan US Germany
1991 57.9 71.4 40.1
1992 59.3 74.1 43.4
1993 63.7 75.8 49
1994 68.8 75 49.2
1995 76.2 74.5 59.1
1996 80.5 73.9 61.9
1997 84.6 71.6 62.8
1998 97.4 68.6 63.3
1999 105.3 65.1 63.5
2000 112.8 60.2 63.5
Source: OECD Economic Outlook
Note: 2000 and 2001 are projected values.Table 5
Real Interest Rates
(Government long bond yield minus expected inflation)
1990-91 1994-95 1998-99
Japan 4.9 3 1.8
US 4.2 4.6 3.8
Germany 4.5 4.3 3
Source: Boltho and Corbett (2000), Table 3
Note: Expected inflation taken from OECD's year-end inflation forecastsTable 6
Changes in Business Start-ups and Closures







Source: Management and Coordination Agency,
Statistical Survey of Business Establishments and EnterprisesTable 7
Factor Analysis of Growth Rate of Real GDP of Japan
Average annual growth rate (National Accounts Data)
All Industries 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-1997
Capital Stock 6.9 3.8 2.8 1.9
Labor Supply 0.4 0 0.4 -0.3
TFP 2.7 1 1.4 0.2
GDP Growth (total) 10 4.8 4.6 1.8
Manufacturing 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-1997
Capital Stock 7.2 2.7 2.1 0.5
Labor Supply 1.4 -0.5 0.6 -1.2
TFP 5.9 3.1 2.4 2
GDP Growth (total) 14.4 5.2 5.1 1.2
Non-manufacturing 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-1997
Capital Stock 6.4 4.5 3.3 2.3
Labor Supply 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.1
TFP 2.2 0 0.8 -0.1
GDP Growth (total) 8.8 4.6 4.4 2.1
Source: MITI, White Paper on International Trade 1998Table 8
Comparative annual growth rate 
computed from OECD InterSectoral Data Base 1997
1973-79 1979-89 1989-1994
GDP 3.33 4 2.11
Japan TFP 0.72 1.79 0.91
Labor Pr. 3.35 3.45 2.81
GDP 2.28 2.68 1.82
US TFP -0.21 0.47 0.57
Labor Pr. 0.12 0.68 0.98
GDP 2.45 1.87 2.47
Germany TFP 2.24 1.19 1.66
Labor Pr. 3.72 2.1 2.77
Source: Wolff (1999), Table 1, Panel II
Notes: GDP in 1990 US $; capital is gross fixed private investment
West German data in all periods
Comparative Labor Productivity Growth
(average % annual change in output/employee)
1980-90 1990-95 1995-98
Japan 2.8 0.9 0.9
US 1.2 1.2 2.1
Germany 1.9 2.4 1.9
Source: OECD (2000)
Comparative TFP Growth Rates
(average % annual change in multifactor productivity)
  1990-95 1996-99
Japan 1.31 0.85
US 0.79 1.47
Germany 1.02 1.07Table 9
Current Capital and Labor Fundamentals for Growth
Private Gross FDI Stock Mkt Avg. Corp Labor Secondary Tertiary Life
InvestmentInflow Capitaliz. Tax Rate Growth School % School % Expectancy
Japan 28.8 0.04 107.5 34.5 -0.3 100 43 80.3
US 17.9 1.77 265.3 40 0.9 96 81 77.4
Germany 21 0.53 60.8 53 -0.2 95 47 77.8
Korea 32.9 0.78 75.8 28 1.1 100 68 73.5
Singapore 35.1 9 216.4 26 0.7 76 39 78.1
Source: Hartnett and Higgins (2000)
Notes: Columns 1-3 are as a % of GDP; Investment and FDI are 1995-98 averages; 
Stock market capitalization and corporate tax rate are 1999; Labor growth is 1998-2000 average; 
School enrollment percentages are 1997; Life expectancy is 1998Table 10
Labor Statistics 1985-99
1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Unemployment rate 2.6 2.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7
Age 20-24 4.1 3.7 5.7 6.1 6.2 7.1 8.4
Men 60-64 7 5.1 7.5 8.5 8.3 10 10.2
Employm. rate (male) 81 81.1 81.9 82.1 82.4 81.6 81
Employm. rate (female) 53 55.7 56.5 56.8 57.5 57.2 56.7
Real wage index 89.9 100 103.2 104.9 105.3 103.1 102.4
Source: Ministry of Labor, Handbook of Labor StatisticsTable 11
Current Technological Fundamentals for Growth
Internet
R&D Hosts PCs Mobile Phone Nobel Prizes
Expend. per 10000 per 1000 per 1000 per capita
Japan 2.8 163.75 237.2 374 0.032
US 2.63 1508.77 458.6 256 0.703
Germany 2.41 173.96 304.7 170 0.329
Korea 2.82 55.53 156.8 302 0
Singapore 1.13 322.3 458.4 346 0
Source: Hartnett and Higgins (2000)
Notes: R&D expenditure is average % of GDP, 1987-1997;
Internet hosts is 1999; PCs and phones is 1998;
Nobel prizes is per million population as of 1999Table 12
Research and Develoment Expenditures 1992-1998
  Total By private firms By public research organization By university




















cash flow   [1]+[2]+
Depreciatio
n cash flow   cash flow   cash flow  
[4]+[5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
100 million yen (current prices)
1992 137 091 63 575 21 471 19 108 32 938 90 536 39 620 16 928 9 194 10 254 23 734 18 968 5 973 2 844 4 835 5 316 27 587 17 982 1 698 4 019 3 888
1993 135 960 64 990 21 620 17 061 32 290 89 803 40 224 16 805 8 756 9 343 23 430 18 632 6 148 3 115 4 522 4 847 27 526 18 617 1 700 3 195 4 013
1994 144 082 67 199 23 042 19 706 34 136 93 959 41 672 17 912 8 674 10 135 24 239 20 302 6 319 3 261 5 216 5 506 29 822 19 208 1 869 4 354 4 391
1995 149 022 68 649 25 483 18 642 36 248 98 813 42 529 20 072 8 625 10 508 25 702 20 078 6 470 3 549 3 935 6 124 30 131 19 650 1 861 4 198 4 422
1996 150 793 69 875 25 604 18 683 36 631 100 584 43 755 20 194 8 673 10 550 26 085 20 078 6 470 3 549 3 935 6 124 30 131 19 650 1 861 4 198 4 422
1997 157 415 72 094 26 948 18 972 39 401 106 584 45 329 21 107 8 968 11 571 28 577 20 239 6 617 3 890 3 444 6 289 30 592 20 148 1 951 3 957 4 536
1998 161 399 74 160 26 500 19 383 41 356 108 001 46 654 20 891 11 185 10 648 29 808 21 170 6 821 3 545 4 072 6 732 32 229 20 685 2 064 4 664 4 816
Share  (%)
1992 100.0 46.4 15.7 13.9 24.0 100.0 43.8 18.7 - 11.3 26.2 100.0 31.5 15.0 25.5 28.0 100.0 65.2 6.2 14.6 14.1
1993 100.0 47.8 15.9 12.5 23.7 100.0 44.8 18.7 - 10.4 26.1 100.0 33.0 16.7 24.3 26.0 100.0 67.6 6.2 11.6 14.6
1994 100.0 46.6 16.0 13.7 23.7 100.0 44.4 19.1 - 10.8 25.8 100.0 31.1 16.1 25.7 27.1 100.0 64.4 6.3 14.6 14.7
1995 100.0 46.3 17.0 12.4 24.3 100.0 43.5 20.1 - 10.5 25.9 100.0 32.2 17.7 19.6 30.5 100.0 65.2 6.2 13.9 14.7
1996 100.0 45.8 17.1 12.1 25.0 100.0 42.5 19.8 - 10.9 26.8 100.0 32.7 19.2 17.0 31.1 100.0 65.9 6.4 12.9 14.8
1997 100.0 45.9 16.4 12.0 25.6 100.0 43.2 19.3 - 9.9 27.6 100.0 32.2 16.7 19.2 31.8 100.0 64.2 6.4 14.5 14.9
1998
Year to Year Change (%)
1992
1993 -1.4 1.9 -7.5 -2.2 -3.1 -5.3 0.9 -10.0 -1.8 -17.6 -5.4 7.0 2.9 -0.1 27.0 0.9 7.1 3.9 9.1 22.5 7.2
1994 -0.8 2.2 0.7 -10.7 -2.0 -0.8 1.5 -0.7 -4.8 -8.9 -1.3 -1.8 2.9 9.5 -6.5 -8.8 -0.2 3.5 0.1 -20.5 3.2
1995 6.0 3.4 6.6 15.5 5.7 4.6 3.6 6.6 -0.9 8.5 3.5 9.0 2.8 4.7 15.4 13.6 8.3 3.2 10.0 36.3 9.4
1996 3.4 2.2 10.6 -5.4 6.2 5.2 2.1 12.1 -0.6 3.7 6.0 -1.1 2.4 8.8 -24.6 11.2 1.0 2.3 -0.4 -3.6 0.7
1997 4.4 3.2 5.2 1.5 7.6 6.0 3.6 4.5 3.4 9.7 9.6 0.8 2.3 9.6 -12.5 2.7 1.5 2.5 4.8 -5.7 2.6
1998 2.5 2.9 -1.7 2.2 5.0 1.3 2.9 -1.0 24.7 -8.0 4.3 4.6 3.1 -8.9 18.2 7.1 5.4 2.7 5.8 17.9 6.2
Source: MITI via Author's CommunicationTable 13
Comparative Allocation of R&D Funds
Total Industrial University
Basic Applied Development Basic Applied Development Basic Applied Development
Japan 15 24.6 60.5 6.8 22.2 71.1 54.2 37.1 8.7
US 17.3 23.2 59.5 5.9 22 72.2 67.1 25.2 7.6
Germany 21   79 5.7 94.3 73.4 26.6
Source: MITI, White Paper on International Trade 1997
Notes: Japan data is FY94, US data is FY95, Germany data is FY91;
German data does not distinguish between Applied and DevelopmentTable 14
Financial Liabilities of Japanese Non-Financial Corporations
(% shares - some categories omitted)


















1997 59.2 8.2Table 15
Comparative Venture Capital - Japan and U.S.
1996 data
Japan US
Outside sources of new venture funding (%)
Pension Funds 0 40
Endowments 0 20
Domestic Corps. 26 18
Financial Sector 49 5
Individuals 1 8
Overseas Investors 4 2
Note: Does not sum to 100% due to missing responses
Venture funding by stage (years from founding)
Less than one 2% 5%
one to five 20% 46%
six to 10 20% 32%
11 to 20(J)/ to 15(US) 25% 12%
21+ (J)/16+ (US) 32% 5%
Overall venture capital environment (1996 data) Ratio Japan:US
VC companies 165 699 24%
Annual total investment Y231B $10B 21% (@Y109/$)
Total new established Y105.5B $6.6B 15% (@Y109/$)
Newly public co's 168 755 22%
Total co's on OTCs 752 5568 14%
Source: Weitzman (1999)Table 16
Comparative Shares of Academic Research




Source: Science Citation Index Database, computed in MITI (1997)
Note: 1994 data
(10000's of papers or citations) Quality Ratio 
Academic Papers Academic Citations (Citations/Papers)
1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996
Japan 7.7 9.9 6.6 7.8 0.86 0.79
US 37.5 34.6 54.6 51.6 1.45 1.49
Germany 7.8 8.5 6.6 9.9 0.85 1.16
Source: OECD (1998), Table 33Table 17
Leading companies in total U.S. patents
Rank in total new patents granted in that year
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
IBM 1 1 1 1 1
NEC 2 3 3 4 4
Canon 3 2 2 2 2
Samsung 4 6 16 18 21
Sony 5 5 9 9 11
Toshiba 6 8 8 7 6
Fujitsu 7 7 5 8 12
Motorola 8 4 4 3 3
Lucent 9 13 11 34 n/a
Mitsubishi Elec. 10 11 7 6 5
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Note: Japanese firms are shown in bold italicsTable 18
Comparative cost structure for business
(1997 data -- Japan=100)
Japan USA Germany Korea Singapore
Energy Petroleum 100 67 117 152 53
Industrial power 100 77 81 44 38
Transport Railway 100 61 67 24
Coastal shipping 100 131 40
Port charges 100 90 47 53
Airfreight (Internat'l) 100 55 73 98 80
Telecoms Local calls 100 97 155 52 29
Long distance 100 48 65 23
 
Real EstateCommercial devel. 100 11 24 28 38
Office rental 100 55 52 56 70
Corp. tax Effective rate 100 82 100 65 54Table 19
Diffusion rate of Personal Computers and Networks
(% of surveyed)
Japan US
Home PC Office PC Networks Home PC Office PC Networks
1994 8.6 11.3 28 36.4 41.1 73
1995 11.1 14.1 35 39.8 46.5 82
1996 14.7 19.8 44 43.4 53.4 86
1997 21.6 27.8 48 47.4 59.1 90
Source: Industrial Policy Bureau (1998)Table 20
Share of Information-related Investment in Private Fixed Capital investment (%)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Japan 16.6 19.6 22.4 24.9 26.4 29.5 34.4
US 26.8 27.7 29.7 31.9 34.1 37.3 42
Difference 10.2 8.1 7.3 7 7.7 7.8 7.6
Source: Tanaka (2000)
Note: Information-related investment includes medical and scientific equipmentTable 21 
Foreign Direct Investment to and from Japan








2000 (1st 6 mos) 1.9 n/a
Source: Ministry of Finance, author's communication .